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Turkish Military, the most trusted institution in the country for decades, has been a 
symbol of modernization and secularism in the country since the independence of the 
Republic in 1923. Especially with the introduction of the multi-party system after the 
Second World War, Turkish Military’s role became conspicuous by military 
interventions. Turkey witnessed 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, and 2007 military interventions 
each in a different character. However, instead of grasping the civilian authority for 
decades, Turkish military elite tried to stay behind the curtains and passed on the 
governance to the civilians. Turkey was under direct control of the military only through 
1960–62 and 1980–83. Especially in the last decade, the change in civil-military 
relations, aroused a scholarly debate over the role of the military in civilian authority. 
This thesis examines the military interventions in order to define the attitudes of the 
military elite, by focusing on the reasons of the fast shift of power from military to 
civilians. This thesis argues that the delegation of power from military to civilians is 
mainly due to the harsh isolation of officer corps from politics, democratic incentives in 
terms of modernization, and economic and institutional developments.  
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A. OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to examine the experience of Turkey with regards to 
civil military relations. Turkish Military, the most trusted institution in the country for 
decades, has been a symbol of modernization and secularism in the country since the 
independence of the Republic in 1923. Especially with the introduction of the multi-party 
system after the Second World War, Turkish Military’s role became conspicuous by 
military interventions. Turkey witnessed 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, and 2007 military 
interventions each in a different character.  
1960 intervention was an actual military coup, after which, the prime minister and 
his two cabinet members were executed, the constitution changed and a military elite 
governed the country for nearly a year. 1971 intervention was an ultimatum which 
affected the course of politics in favor of the military institutions, but did not open the 
way for a military regime. 1980 military coup was similar to 1960 coup in a sense that the 
military took the power for three years. The one in 1997 was accepted as a post-modern 
intervention, since the military urged the prime minister to resign, but did not take the 
authority. 2007 intervention, which was a warning about the presidential elections to the 
politicians by the Chief of the General Staff, had the least effect in the political arena. It 
was not only rejected by the government of the time but also bolstered its prestige as a 
political element. In essence, although the character of the intervention sometimes turned 
out to be a military coup, Turkish military elite tried to stay behind the curtains and 
passed on the governance to the civilians instead of grasping the civilian authority for 
decades. 
This thesis specifically will focus on the shift of power from military to civilians 
after the military interventions. 1960 and 1980 military coups will be the landmarks in 
terms of periodization of the Turkish civil military relations history, since only after these 
two military interventions did the Turkish Military take the power and the authority of the 
civilian government. Thus, the main research question is: “What are the factors and 
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causative explanations that favor the military to delegate the governmental authority back 
to civilians?” 
This thesis examines the military coups in order to define the attitudes of the 
military elite, by focusing on the reasons of the fast shift of power from military back to 
civilians. This thesis argues that the delegation of power from military to civilians is 
mainly due to the harsh isolation of officer corps from politics, democratic incentives in 
terms of modernization, and economic and institutional developments.  
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
Turkish Military, the most trusted institution in the country for decades, has been 
a symbol of modernization and secularism in the country since the independence of the 
Republic in 1923. However, modern Turkey has a history of military interventions and 
transitions to democracy. The recurrence of the military interventions proves the role of 
the military as the ‘guardian of the state,’ while the recurrence of the transitions to 
democracy proves that Turkish military is committed to a democratic form of 
government. Thus, it would be logical to state that Turkish military has two conflicting 
political traditions: the ‘guardian,’ and the ‘modernizer.’1   
The role of the Turkish military in politics had always been debated. However, in 
the last five years, a number of lawsuits were brought and numerous officers including 
several retired four-star generals have been sued in the civilian courts. Moreover, some of 
these four-star generals, accused of planning a military coup against the elected 
government, have been sentenced to 18–20 years, which even could not be imagined a 
short period of time ago. These developments have manifested that the course of civil 
military relations in Turkey have a new track. Thus, in these years, it is crucial to 
understand the motives of democracy among the military elite in Turkey, whose superiors 
had transitioned the administration of the country to democracy after 1960 and 1980 
coups.    
                                                 
1 Dağı, İhsan D. Democratic Transitions in Turkey, 1980-83: The Impact of the European Diplomacy. 
Middle Eastern Studies, 32, no. 2, April 1996, 124. 
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The importance of this study is twofold. Firstly, it tries to explain the causative 
explanations of shift of power from military to civilians after the military interventions, 
particularly touching on the historical background. Secondly, it seeks to understand the 
dynamics of civil-military relations in Turkey, which gained importance in the last 
decade with the engagement of the high rank generals in lawsuits, regarding alleged 
coups against the incumbent government.  
C. METHOD OF ANALYSES 
This study employs the periodization method, which divides the past into periods 
that can be obviously identified and that differ from one another in a perceivable way. 
The military interventions, which became socially, politically, economically and 
historically turning points of the Turkish history, will be the landmarks of the 
periodization method.  
Although there are five military interventions (1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, and 2007) 
in Turkish history, only two of them (1960 and 1980) were actual military coups. Since 
we studied the transition from military regime to democracy after the military coups, we 
did not consider 1971, 1997, and 2007 military interventions as landmarks in our study 
although they had great importance in Turkey’s recent history. 
Since Turkish military history goes back to 209 B.C., it is important for our study 
to analyze the historical background of Turkish army in terms of civil military relations. 
Historical background will provide the traditional military institution and its traditional 
role in Turkish politics. It will cover a timeline beginning from the Ottoman times until 
1918, the beginning of the independence struggle for the Republic of Turkey. The first 
period will cover 1918–1960. The second period will analyze the two decades between 
1960 and 1980 military coups. The third and the last period will examine the civil 
military relations since the last military coup of 1980. 
 
1. The Underlying Causes of the Military Interventions in Turkey 
The underlying causes of the military interventions in Turkey are; 
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 Socio-political conditions 
 Military Professionalism (Turkish interpretation) 
2. The Variables of the Study      
In our study, we will examine three periods of modern Turkish civil-military 
relations history. In each period, we will look for the developments in terms of our 
variables. The developments of a previous period are effective in the fast transition of 
power of the next period. The variables that we will work on are:  
 Isolation from politics, 
 Democratic Motives, 
 Economic and Institutional Developments. 
Through this periodical examination of the history of civil military relations in 
Turkey in regards to these variables, this study seeks to find causative explanations to the 
power shift from the military back to the civilians after the military coups. 
D. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis consists of seven chapters:  
Chapter I is the introduction. In this chapter, the objective of the study will be 
explained. The Importance of the study is mostly due to the last developments in civil 
military relations in Turkey. The method of the study will be summarized and this section 
will be the last part of the first chapter. 
Chapter II reviews the literature on the concepts of civil military relations in terms 
of military interventions and transition to democracy. In this chapter, the underlying 
causes of Turkey’s military interventions will be scrutinized. The military 
professionalism and the socio-political weaknesses and their relation to the civil military 
relations of Turkey will be summarized. It will be understood that the recurrent 
interventions in Turkey are due to socio political weaknesses, while recurrent transitions 
to democracy is partly due to the ‘modernizer’ role of the Turkish military. It then 
summarizes a theoretical framework designed for analyzing the motives of shift of power 
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from military elite to the civilians. Lastly the terms with their meanings in the study are 
explained. 
Chapter III is explaining the background of the civil military relations in Turkish 
history. The unique system of Janissaries of the Ottoman Empire, their initial successes, 
and their evolution towards being a problematic political element will be summarized. 
The urgent need of a reform in the military, the repercussions and the beginning of the 
tradition of interventions in Turkish military will be viewed in that chapter. The Prussian-
style modernization of the army and the infiltration of politics into military will shed light 
on the first organized interventions of Turkish military. The most important section of 
this chapter is the Summary and the Inferences, which will draw a framework of the 
evolution of civil military relations. It will be seen that the traditional role of the military 
had been evolved from being the privileged guardians of the Ottoman Palace, to the 
guardian of the Turkish regime.  
Chapter IV is the first period of the Modern Turkish civil military relations 
history. It covers the period between 1923 in which the Turkish Republic was founded 
and 1960, in which the first military intervention was made. In this chapter, the evolution 
of the role of the military, which culminated with an intervention in which the prime 
minister of the republic was executed, is being examined.  
Chapter V is the second period of the study which covers the post 1960 
intervention and 1980 intervention. In this period, the changes in Turkish army after 1960 
coup and the effects of 1971 coup are being examined.  
Chapter VI is the third and the last period of the study which begins with 1980 
military coup and extends to the contemporary civil military relations issues that Turkey 
witnessed in recent years.  
The final chapter (Chapter VII) offers the summary and the conclusion to the 
‘puzzle’ as to what are the causative explanations of the shift of power from military elite 
to the civilians.  
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II. REVIEW OF THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
For a better understanding of the framework of the analysis of the civil-military 
relation processes in Turkey, this chapter examines literature on military intervention. 
Specifically, it will explain the concepts of military intervention, and the general 
literature on civil military relations in Turkey.   
In the literature on intervention, there are two widely accepted theories that 
explain military involvement in politics of modern states. These concepts focus on 
military professionalism and the socio-political reasons for military coups. 
B. MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM  
The leading advocate of military professionalism was Samuel P. Huntington who 
introduced one of the most significant contributions to theories of military intervention in 
politics.2[A1] Huntington explains (with the definition of Harold Laswell) the central skill 
of officers as “the management of violence.”3 He adds that this strange ability of military 
officers is universal because its essence does not change in different times or locations.  
The management of violence is an ample explanation of the nature of the military 
coups. If there is uncontrolled violence in a country and if civilian institutions which 
represent the state and the legal power cannot ease the violence, the military must control 
it. This quality of the military made it different from all kinds of civilian professions. 
Huntington makes comparisons between an officer and a dentist and he concludes that 
civilians work for their own economic interests, whereas military officers do not think of 
personal advantage. It is the nature of military expertise; the officers bear a social 
                                                 
2 Huntington, P. Samuel. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and the Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957. 
3Ibid., 11. 
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responsibility by nature of their vocation. If any officer breaks this responsibility in order 
to follow his personal ambitions, he breaks also the fabric of society.4 
Huntington’s sensible evaluations clarify the universal understanding of the 
military profession; the profession draws its own limitations for its own sake and out of 
loyalty to its office rather than any kind of advantageous position. Briefly, Huntington’s 
professionalism, which can be described as expertise, responsibility, and corporateness,5 
is based on universal description of military profession. 
Huntington mentions the merit of professionalism, which was introduced by the 
Prussian Army to the West. Moreover, he attributes the success of the Prussian Army 
over the French Army to the professional system of the Prussians.6 He presents the 
underlying factors in the growth of military professionalism as;  
 The growth of population, 
 The growth of the nation state, 
 The rise of democratic ideals, 
 A recognized legitimate authority over the military forces.7 
The growth of population helped form mass armies with hundreds of thousands of 
soldiers under numerous branches that had different functions. War was no more an 
uncomplicated and simple affair. Land and naval forces made it more difficult to 
coordinate so many different specialties. Thus, a new specialist was needed, who 
coordinated all of those differences into one direction. This was the professional military 
officer.8 




7 Ibid., 30–35. 
8Ibid., 32. 
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The growth of the nation state helped military professionalism in supplying the 
needs of the military both in monetary terms and human resources. The provision of the 
needs of an officer corps necessitated a society that had highly developed governmental 
institutions which were, in turn, fed by national resources.9 
The rise of democratic ideas was crucial due to the fact that military intervention 
was a matter of democracy.10 Huntington emphasizes that the rise of democratic ideals 
and parties influenced the growth of professionalism. Democratic ideals had to battle 
aristocratic ones in order to survive. It was a clash of the definition of military, either a 
democratic army, which was based on national and democratic ideals, or an aristocratic 
army, which was a monopoly of nobles over the military. However, Huntington sees “a 
military that is neither democratic nor aristocratic” based on a new definition which 
necessitates that the military be an institution relied on its own principles.11 
A recognized legitimate authority controlling the military forces was the most 
critiqued part of military intervention, because in the background of many military coups 
it was the absence of such a controlling power which exposed the state to an imminent 
military intervention. Huntington draws attention to the necessary loyalty of an officer to 
an authority completely divorced from constitutional politics.12 
Bruneau, stresses the sources of tension in civil-military relations, in addition to 
Huntington. According to Bruneau, different cultural norms between political leaders and 
military officers are permanent source of tension. The harmony of a rational foreign 
policy and maintaining a military in accordance with this policy is critical to prevent any 
probable tension.13 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 33. 
10 Acemoglu, Daron, et al. A Theory of Military Dictatorships. National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Working Paper No. 13915, 2008. 
11 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 34. 
12 Ibid., 37. 
13 Bruneau, Thomas C. Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relation. 
Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006., 23. 
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Andreski’s stratification that emphasizes the importance of power contributed to 
the significance of a professional point of view. Andreski brings historical facts to the 
fore and asserts that “everywhere we find that those who bear arms constitute a privileged 
stratum.”14 
As a conclusion, we can say that military professionalism, which was defined by 
Huntington, is a factor that keeps the officer corps away from a political activity. The 
reasons of this professionalism are not confined to what have been written above; they 
may vary in different countries. And in Turkish case there is another version of 
professionalism, which doesn’t keep the officer corps away from taking actions against 
the government, but prevents them from insisting on staying in the power of the civilian 
authority. According to the Turkish military elite, who organized the interventions, the 
intervening action is due to the inability of the civilian politicians. In their view, the 
professionalism “necessitates to intervene and re-organize (or regulate) the political 
system, and return it to the civilians.” In this study we will try to explain the motives of 
that Turkish military professionalism, which urged the military regimes to intervene, and 
soon after delegate the authority back to the civilians.  
C. SOCIO-POLITICAL CONDITIONS 
Samuel E. Finer is one of the main scholars of civil military relations literature. 
Different from Huntington, who assumes that the professionalism of the military and its 
nature will tend to obey to the civilian rule, Finer claims that the nature of military tends 
to disobey. Asserting that civilian control of military is not natural, Finer states that 
different institutions with different purposes have a potential to conflict unless, he claims, 
the disposition of the military is to obey. Thus, it is the occasion and the disposition of 
the military that will decide a probable intervention.15  
                                                 
14 Andreski, Stanislav. Military Organizations and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1968, 20–74. 
15 Finer, E. Samuel. The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 2006, 23. 
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Finer’s maturity division was the second theory explaining the causes of 
interventions with social and political conditions. A professor of government and politics 
in England after World War II, he came up with his theory about the political atmosphere 
which invited or prevented a military intervention. He asserted that only countries with 
mature political institutions and behaviors are actually immune to any kind of military 
intervention.16 He divided the levels of intervention into four types according to the 
maturity of political culture: 
Mature political culture (influence), 
Developed political culture (blackmail), 
Low political culture (displacement), 
Minimal political culture (supplantment)17 
Finer’s study of civil military relations and military interventions successfully 
focuses on the reasons and the causative explanations of military interventions and he 
places Turkey into the “low political culture” countries together with Spain and 
Argentina. However, there is something more to say about a framework for explaining 
the fast shift of power from the Turkish Military to the civilians. 
Actually the answer is among the explanations of Finer. Although Turkish 
military elite delegated the governmental authority back to civilians, it is scholarly 
accepted that they continued to have a say in the politics and went on playing a custody 
role on the regime. If we adapt the attitude of the military elite to Finer’s Modes of 
Intervention (which are written in the parentheses above), Turkey’s military elite have a 
role of displacement but not a supplantment. Thus, Finer, accepts that Turkish military’s 
role in the politics is not supplanting but regulating or redirecting. This classification is a 
theoretical explanation to the fast shift of power from military to civilians in Turkey. 




After these theoretical explanations of Turkish professionalism and the modes of 
the military intervention in the politics, the actual events should be analyzed for a better 
understanding of the fast shift of power. 
D. CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY 
The history of civil military relations, specifically military interventions is rife 
with examples that the military will delegate the civilian authority back to a civilian 
government in a short period of time but the promises are mostly broken. However, 
Turkish army becomes an exception. Despite this exception, the role of the Turkish 
military as an actor in politics continues.   
There are two themes explaining the role of the military as an actor in Turkey; the 
first theme accepts Turkish military as an independent actor, irrelevant from the civilian 
elite; the second theme interprets the condition of the military as a power in coordination 
with a civilian cadre. Most of the scholars use the first theme, accepting the Turkish 
military as an independent power in the politics. Similarly, we will use both of the themes 
in this study. 
William Hale, as a proponent of the first theme, stresses the shift of power from 
military to a civilian government:  
[A2]As Dankwart A. Rustow has reminded us, incoming military regimes 
usually promise a quick return to civilian rule, but seldom live up to the 
premise (Dankwart (1963). The fact that the Turkish army has proved 
exceptional in this respect indicates that the conditions which have 
determined its actions have differed significantly from those of other 
countries.[A3]18 
It gains importance to define the different conditions that led to the relatively 
short direct military rules in Turkey. There may be many different interpretations of those 
conditions; international politics, the political inheritance from the Ataturk or earlier 
                                                 
18 Hale, Transition in Turkey, 159.  
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periods, or Turkish military’s own experiences from previous interventions are some of 
them.19 
Ahmet Kuru, a proponent of the second theme and an associate professor of 
political science in San Diego University, explains that the political role of the Turkish 
military has a direct proportion with the support of ideological allies in the country. He 
emphasizes that military leaders do not intervene in the politics by themselves; on the 
contrary they are highly supported and encouraged by civilian ideological allies. Kuru 
analyzes military intervention as a problem for democratic consolidation; in accordance, 
he believes that democracy will become more powerful with the decline of the military’s 
political power. He implies that military interventions are carried out in favor of civilian 
allies.20 
Kemal H. Karpat successfully touches on the transition to civilian control after the 
first military intervention in 1960 in Turkey. However, he doesn’t explain the reasons 
lying beneath the immediate transition.21  
Mehmet Ali Birand, one of the most famous investigative journalists and news 
men in Turkey, includes vast information about the path to the third military intervention 
in 1980 in his book The General’s Coup in Turkey.22 He brilliantly gives voice to 
valuable personal data about the elite that planned and activated the military coup. 
However, he fails to provide the motives of the generals and causative explanations of the 
transition to democratic regime.  
George Harris, a Professorial Lecturer at George Washington University and an 
expert on Turkey’s regimes, depicts the attitudes of the generals as saviors of Turkey:  
                                                 
19 Ibid., 160. 
20 Kuru, Ahmet. The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage in Turkey: Fears of Islamism, Kurdism, and 
Communism. Insight Turkey, Vol. 14, no. 2, 2012, 37–57. 
21 Karpat, Kemal H. Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey ,Before and After 
1980. In State, Democracy, and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s. New York: Walter de Gruyter 
Publications, 1988, 137–158.  
22 Birand, Mehmet Ali. The Generals’ Coup in Turkey: An Inside Story of 12 September 1980. New 
York: Brasseys Defense Publishers, 1987. 
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When the generals moved to take power in this situation, they acted on the 
premise that the regime required more extensive adjustments than in 
1971. . . . In short they believed that they were acting to save Turkish 
democracy from itself. . . . The military leaders sought to carry out these 
aims by reworking the constitution and amending the political parties act 
and the elections law.23 
Different from the authoritarian constitution of 1961,  
The adjustments embodied in the 1982 version were designed to prove 
ways to prevent parliamentary deadlock or to end it through such 
expedients as elections.24 
Harris emphasizes the co-existence of civilian and military elites in the authority 
on the transition process. Foreign policy and economy were under the control of the 
prime minister, who liberalized the economy, while Evren, with his council comprised of 
some other generals, helped the administration by guiding the army to the emergent terror 
threats in the eastern provinces. There was a successful (if not harmonious) military and 
civilian coexistence.25 Despite the author’s keen determinations about the soft approaches 
of the generals towards the politicians, he doesn’t illuminate the causative factors that 
compelled them to do so.      
Nil Satana, an associate professor in Bilkent University in Turkey and an expert in 
civil-military relations, compares the types of civil-military relations of Europe, Turkey 
and the Middle East. She concludes that Turkey’s civil-military relations type is closer to 
the European type; however, she has something to say about afterwards of military 
interventions in Turkey and transition process.26 
In order to show the effects of the international organizations on civil-military 
relations of a country, Bruneau asserts that European Union (EU) had positive effects on 
the democratization process and preventing a possible military regime in Portugal in 
                                                 
23 Harris, George S. The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics. Middle East Journal, Vol. 19, no. 2, 
Part II, Spring, 1965, 193–195.  
24 Ibid., 193–195. 
25 Ibid., 177–200.  
26 Şatana, Nil S. Civil-Military Relations in Europe, the Middle East, and Turkey. Turkish Studies, 
Vol. 12, No.2. Accessed November, 9, 2012.  doi: 10.1080/14683849.2011.572634., 279–292.  
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1974.27 There are some other scholars who think that Turkey’s membership process to 
EU had a similar effect on civil-military relations in Turkey in the late 1990s, which had 
affected the nature of the military intervention that turned out to be a soft coup in 1997.28 
E. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSES 
In order to analyze Turkey and its military history in terms of military 
interventions and the fast shift of power from military to the civilians, it is important to 
take into consideration both the motives that caused the interventions and the motives 
that caused the military elite to walk out on the civilian domain of the authority 
It is the weakness of the civilian governance that has the priority on pulling the 
military towards an intervention, while the coherence and intention of the military elite 
have an inclination toward an intervention. In Turkey case, the cause of the military 
intervention mostly shapes the outcome of it. From that point on, we will analyze the 
causes of the interventions in parallel with the causes of the shift of power after the 
interventions.  
The underlying causes of the military interventions in Turkey are; 
 Socio-political conditions 
 Military Professionalism (Turkish interpretation) 
In that analysis, we will examine each period according to three variables; 
 Isolation of the officer corps from politics, 
 Democratic incentives in terms of modernization,  
 Economic and institutional developments. 
                                                 
27 Bruneau, Thomas C. Democratization as a Global Phenomenon and its impact on Civil-Military 
Relations. Democratization, Vol.13, no. 5, December 2006, 780.  
28 Aydinli, Ersel et al. The Turkish Military’s March toward Europe. Foreign Affairs, Vol.85, No.1, 
Jan-Feb 2006, 77-90.  
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F. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS OF THE STUDY 
A reader that is not familiar with the civil military relations terminology may get 
confused with some terms used in this study. In this study, 
“MilitaryCoup” means the seizure of the civilian authority by the military. 
“Intervention” means, a military interference which changes the course of the 
political life, it may be an actual coup or a more passive, only a redirecting action,  
“Military Regime” means the tenure that military elite governs the country 
without taking off their uniforms, 
“Civilian Authority” means the democratically elected civilian politicians and 
governments.    
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III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
1. The Role of the Military in the Ottoman Empire (1299–1922) 
Turkish history and the role of the military cannot be understood without 
examining the history of the Ottoman Empire (1299–1922). Ottoman Empire was 
founded in western Anatolia by nomadic Turks from the steppes of east Euroasia.29 From 
the very beginning of the Ottoman dynasty the administration of the army and the state 
had been interconnected, since a Sultan had been both the leader of the state and the 
army. In a short period of history, the Ottomans annexed their lands from East Europe to 
the Yemen, from the Caspian Sea to Morocco.  
One of the main reasons of the search for new lands was to introduce the Islam as 
well as to gain new tax revenues from those new lands. Thus, the religion and the 
economy were the primary motives of the Ottoman Dynasty which based on territorial 
expansion in the initial stages of its history.30 It was the military that became the driving 
force of that territorial expansion. Thus, religion and economy, specifically military and 
state were nested in each other which formed a successful partnership for the first 
centuries of the Empire.   
2. A Successful System: Janissaries (Devshirmes) 
The second Sultan of the Ottoman State31, OrhanGazi began to create a new 
army, after the first quarter of the 14th century, based on the Christian youths aged 
between twelve and twenty, who were taken from their families and converted to Islam. 
This army was called ‘YeniÇeri (Janissary)’ which meant the ‘new troops.’ They were 
trained in the Turkish farms among the Turkish families, and learned the language and 
the religion before taking a rigorous education in the Palace where they had the chance to 
                                                 
29 Shaw, Stanford J. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Vol. 1. New York: 
Cambridge Publications, 1977, 1. 
30 Ibid., 12. 
31 Author’s Note: Ottoman Empire was not an “Empire” until the conquest of Constantinople—
Istanbul—in 1453. 
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join the state’s ruling elite. Those soldiers were called as devshirme which meant ‘the 
converted.’  
The practice may sound harsh and even barbarous to our modern 
sensibilities, but the idea of being recruited into devshirme was so 
attractive to some that an occasional Muslim family would even ask their 
Christian neighbors to pass off their Muslim children as Christians so that 
they could be recruited.32 
The devshirme, which was based on recruits who were taken purely according to 
their abilities, and generally from modest and rural areas, unlike feudal Europe where 
one’s status in life would be determined according to the birth, integrated the Christian 
populations of the conquered lands into the Imperial System. Moreover, being a 
devshirme or a Janissary was a privilege, which cannot be gained by birth.  
This privilege was bolstered by the fact that the devshirmes were only loyal to the 
Sultan, who was their master; in return they were the ‘kuls’ (slaves) of the Sultan. The 
Sultan had the power of life and death on them.33 This loyalty generated a position for 
them besides the ruling elite. The Janissaries became a destructive factor for the Empire 
in the next centuries partly due to the feeling of being privileged.  
Religious ties created coherence among the Janissaries. Strong dependence on 
religion, nested in the military from the very beginning of the Janissaries since they were 
blessed by a religious leader whose sect had been the primary faith of the Janissaries until 
their dissolution in 1826.34 In the first centuries of the Empire, when the powerful Sultans 
were still on the saddles of their horses, conducting their armies, this coherence were 
helpful, since the Sultans were the leaders of their armies as well as that of religious sect. 
After the territorial expansion era ended in the 17th century, and the Janissaries had no 
income from waging wars, this coherence gave power to them to revolt.  
In the 14th and 15th centuries, Ottoman State had well-organized and disciplined 
army, consisting of nearly 12000 janissaries (who were infantry of the time, consisting of 
                                                 
32 Ahmad, Feroz. Turkey: The Quest for Identity. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2005, 4. 
33 Ibid., 3–5. 
34 Ibid., 3–5. 
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the devshirmes), about 8000 sipahis (or well-trained cavalry, consisting of the Anatolian 
Turks), almost 40000 other troops which were led by rural notables and many thousands 
of irregulars. Christian vassals also supplied troops for fighting in Anatolia and Europe. 
A Serbian army fought within the Ottoman Army against the Mongols in 1402 Ankara 
War and a Wallachian Army in the siege of Vienna in 1683. Faroz Ahmad states in his 
well-known book Turkey:The Quest for Identity;  
As late as 1683, during the second siege of Vienna, a Wallachian corps 
was given the task of bridging the Danube. A Muslim Ottoman Army, 
supposedly waging ‘holy war’ was willing to use Christian troops!35 
The 16th century was the zenith of the Ottoman power, in which the Magnificent 
Suleiman ruled for nearly half a century and died in a war in 1566. After the demise of 
the Magnificent Suleiman, Ottoman armies had to wage long wars in two fronts, one in 
the Asia against the Persians (1578–90) and the other in the Europe against the 
Habsburgs of Austria (1593). The last quarter of the 16th century was the herald of the 
fact that the next century for the Ottoman Empire was going to be difficult. Firstly 
because of the domestic unrest and secondly because the rising powers in the Europe 
were using monetary systems in their economies, while Ottoman Armies were still fed on 
land based economic regulations.  
3. Janissaries Became an Element of Disorder 
In 1589, the Janissaries in Istanbul revolted. The reason of the revolt was a 
scholarly debate. According to Feroz Ahmad, the revolt was under the pretext of 
decreased payments and lower life standards.36 For Stanford Shaw, the first revolt was 
instigated by the Sipahis, who were basically Anatolian Turks and were not in good terms 
with the Janissary priority in Istanbul and with the devshirmes at all; thus, the Janissary 
made the second revolt against the Sipahis.37  It is out of our case to search such details, 
but it is important to note that the revolt was made by the Janissaries, which was quelled 
only in 1592.  
                                                 
35 Ibid., 5. 
36 Ibid., 19. 
37 Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 186. 
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The unrest, which could almost shadow the successes of the 16th century in the 
Empire, took place in the central Anatolia and named as the Celali rebellions. It was 
ideologically supported by the Safevids, but materially backed by either soldiers that 
were out of army or the elite that were sent out of the Palace, in both cases they were 
mostly the devshirmes. Thus, 16th century was marked as the most successful era and the 
time that the Empire reached to its largest borders, together with upheavals that the 
military partly participated in.   
The developments of the 17th century, which may be called by some scholars as 
the ‘century of the crisis,’ for the Ottoman Empire, economically deteriorated the 
situation. It was mainly the economy of wars that affected the Empire. Having long wars 
with rising powers like Russia or Austria-Hungary, it became nearly impossible to 
maintain the manpower with the old tactics based on land. So the devshirme system had 
been almost completely left by recruiting the Janissaries as the Kapikulu soldiers who 
were the guardians of the Sultan and the Palace.38 
4. Need for Reform  
In the 17th century, it was understood that reforms were necessary, but the first 
overt reactions appeared in the 17th century. It reached to a level that the palace, first time 
in the history of the Empire, witnessed the execution of a Sultan by the Janissaries in 
1622. Janissaries became a decisive force to determine the next candidate of the throne. 
Only after the half of the century, could the Empire recovered from military intervention 
of the Janissaries, ironically with the wisdom of a devshirme, who became the grand 
vizier of the Empire. He was Koprulu Mehmet Pasha, who initiated the successful 
Koprulu dynasty of the viziers in the Empire.  
18th century began with a reformer Sultan, who ruled more than a quarter of a 
century. Freedom of press and the ‘Tulip Period’ marked the beginning of this period, 
which began to change the ideas of the Ottomans. However, the Sultan could not escape 
being replaced with the next Sultan by another revolt, called as PatronaHalil Revolt in 
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1730. As a matter of course, the leader of the rebel was an Albanian Janissary.39 The next 
Sultan and his administration were not traditional reformers. The grand vizier tried to 
open the door to a modern army by providing European advisers. But the continuous 
change of the bureaucrats prevented the expected effects of a modernization. However, in 
the last quarter of this century, the Sultan in person, dealt with the modernization of the 
army. That was why a revival in the Navy and in the Artillery was encountered to the end 
of the 18th century.  
 19th century began with another miserable event, in which one of the most 
reformist Sultans of the Empire was ousted from the power in 1807. III. Selim, who was 
in the throne in between 1789–1807 and who had corresponded with Louis XVI before 
being a Sultan, had to implement his reforms in a challenging era. The Empire had an 
excruciating war with Russia and Austria through 1787–92. In that period the tremendous 
demands of the war urged the Ottoman administration to rely more and more on the 
notables who for man and Armies, which in return gave them a chance to strengthen and 
extend their power. Thus, after the war, it was almost impossible for the Sultan to gain 
any significant control over them.40 
5. “Nizam-I Cedid” Reforms and Isolation of Military from Politics 
Throughout the difficult last decade of the 18th century and the challenging first 
decade of the 19th century, the Sultan, III Selim, tried to implement his reforms, among 
the risks of disintegration in the Empire. Those reforms were called as the “New Order 
(Nizam-I Cedid).” One of the most significant reforms that III Selim implemented was 
the organizational reform, through which he separated the administrative and military 
functions in each corps, with a separate civilian supervisor.41 It was a turning point in 
civil-military relations of the Empire that helped his successor to completely abolish the 
Janissaries from the military in 1826.  
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The separation of the military and administrative institutions was a watershed in 
the civil-military relations history of Turkey. It was the seed of a tradition of isolation 
from politics in the Turkish Army which will be engrained in the officer corps for more 
than two centuries. The only exception of this isolation in the first decade of the 
20thcentury concluded with an insulting defeat from Balkan countries in 1912. It is an 
issue of a further research.  
III Selim reduced the size of the Janissaries, tried to take the notables under 
control who owned lands and provided men and armies, and professionalized several 
branches in the army like Artillery, Mortar, Mine-laying, and Cannon-Wagon branches.42 
His last attempt to abolish the Janissaries and establish a new army ended up with his 
execution by another Janissary revolt in 1807. Just after his death, the grand vizier of the 
time made an agreement with the notables, or local rulers, which was called as the 
Charter of Alliance, or the Ottoman Magna Carta, in 1808. The charter of alliance 
(Sened-i ittifak) between the central government and the local rulers secured the rights of 
the rulers in return to their alliance to the Sultan. Another Janissary revolt took place after 
the agreement which replaced the grand vizier, and the Sultan with the condition of the 
abolition of the new army.43 
6. Notables as an Element of Disorder (1820–1840) 
With the ascendance of the new Sultan, II Mahmud (1808–1838), to the throne, a 
new struggle began. The local rulers or notables began to show signs of disobedience. He 
defeated one of his rulers, Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, in Greece, in 1820, which weakened his 
position in the region that led to the independence of the Greece. Another ruler, Mehmed 
Ali Pasha, who ruled Egypt after the short invasion of Napoleon, wanted to strengthen his 
position by demanding more lands in return for helping the Sultan to quell the Greek 
revolt in the 1820s. This domestic problem between the Sultan and his ruler went ahead 
and became an international crisis, which is out of this research.  
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II Mahmud abolished the already useless Janissary corps in 1826, which was also 
decreased in number, by establishing a new army. That was called as the beneficial event. 
II Mahmud had a significant role in the institutionalization of the army by establishing 
military academies for the land forces, navy and engineering branches in 1830s. He also 
institutionalized the civilian administration by implementing a new cabinet system 
consisting of ministers. II Mahmud’s tenure ended with the most famous reform of the 
Empire: Tanzimat (Restructuring or Reorganization) in 1839. This was the official 
intention for a westernization process in the Empire.   
7. Tanzimat Reforms 1839–187144 
Tanzimat reforms were the most effective and broad of all the reform movements 
till then. However, they needed another 50 years to be completely implemented. 
Moreover, they were generally new laws, new regulations, or new institutions, rather than 
the abolition of the old ones.45 This, in times, caused a duality in the institutions of the 
state, but accelerated the path for more modern administration. 
Christians in the Empire were also incorporated into the Army which was 
forbidden for centuries. Conscription method was introduced. One of the important 
reforms related with the military was the reorganization of the provincial armies under 
one command in Istanbul. This ended the polyphony within the army, which had caused 
numerous upheavals for centuries. The creation of a modern navy in the 1860s ended up 
with a military fleet third in the Europe.   
The civil military relations of the Ottoman Empire, was shaped in 19th century by 
the two reforms, first of which had isolated the officer corps from politics in the first 
quarter of the century, and the second of which had institutionalized the state and the 
army by the separation of powers and establishment of military institutions in the second 
quarter of the century. 
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8. 1876:The First Military Intervention of the Turkish Army 
With the newest regulations, the military organizations gathered under the 
command of the Serasker (Chief of General Staff of the time) in Istanbul. This was a 
continuation of isolation of the military from politics. It would never be thought that the 
Serasker himself would one day participate in the organization of a coup, and execution 
of the Sultan under the pretext of suicide. 
The coup was also supported by the Young Turks (or Young Ottomans), an 
organization established in 1860s in support of constitutional monarchy. They wanted to 
end the autocracy of the Sultan and his bureaucrats, convinced that the laws of the state 
could not be reformed under absolutism.46 
The intervention created a crisis in1876.It turned out to be one of the most 
difficult yearsin the history of the Ottoman Empire, since it was the year of the first 
organized military coup, a year of three different Sultans, and a year of radical changes in 
the political system. After the execution/suicide of the incumbent Sultan, the health 
conditions of the second Sultan were not convenient for being a statesman; that was why, 
a third Sultan had to ascend to the throne. The third Sultan had to accept the new 
constitution and constitutional monarchy. Thus, 1876 became a turning point in the 
history of the Empire since radical changes in the course of history took place in this 
year. 
1876 military coup, with the support of some political elite and Young Turks, 
became the first military coup in the history of the Turkish army, causing radical changes 
in the political system. This feature of the intervention would preserve itself for a century 
regardless of radical changes in the regime or political system. 
However, the new Sultan, who ruled the Empire in between 1876–1908, closed 
the parliament due to the war with Russia in 1788–89. He used a despotic way of 
management, under which he passivized the army and its possible rivalry against himself. 
Using the label of the Caliphate (the leader of the all Muslims on the earth), he had 
successfully maintained an already shattering Empire for three decades, but he could not 
                                                 
46 Ahmad, Turkey, 37. 
 25
prevent the Young Turksmovement making use of the popular discontent against his 
despotism. Finally, he had to descend from throne after another intervention in 1908.    
The officers that were educated in the last quarter of the 19th century were imbued 
with the Prussian/German style of warfare, since Germany became the ally of the Empire, 
in that era. The famous German military strategist,Wilhelm Leopold Colmar Freiherr von 
der Goltz, served for 12 years in the reorganization of the Ottoman armyuntil 1895. His 
books (most importantly, A Nation at Arms) and many western oriented books were taken 
into the curriculum of the military academy, which affected the cadets to become imbued 
with the liberal thoughts.47 The fresh officers of the Empire in the new century were 
ready for the imminent military intervention.  
In that point it should be noted that, the Young Turks movement also had a great 
effect on preparing the officer corps for a change in the system. The main thinker of the 
Young Turks, Namik Kemal was punished to leave the country; he went to France and 
regrouped his organization. The officers, who were in the 2nd and 3rd armies in the 
Balkans, were in touch with the new promising ideas of the movement. Thus, military 
was preparing for an internal war, a war that would change the political system of the 
Empire.   
9. 1908 Intervention and the Structure of the Officer Corps 
In the first decade of the 20th century, there was a general discomfort in the 
Empire. This was the same among the officer corps. Therefore, they tended to participate 
in some underground organizations. Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which was 
largely supported by the Young Turks, was established in 1806. Their cause was to 
change the administrative system of the Empire from autocracy to constitutional 
monarchy.   
Everything was ready when anuprising took place in Istanbul in 13 May 1808. 
The officers, who were organized by CUP, had taken lead positions for quelling the 
uprising with a mass army, after which they carried out the 1908 military intervention. 
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The Sultan was replaced, and a new constitution was written, similar but more liberal 
with regard to the constitution of the 1876. The structure of the officer corps was also 
changed in favor of the CUP officers: 
In the army, the main source of trouble was the friction between the 
mektepli officers, who had been trained in the military schools and 
academy, and the alayli officers, who had risen through the ranks. The 
latter had been favored by the old regime, being paid regularly and 
stationed in the First Army in and around Istanbul, while the former had 
been mistrusted (rightly so, because it was these modern educated officers 
who brought about the constitutional revolution of 1908). Now the 
mektepli officers had taken over. Many of the alayli officers had dismissed 
or demoted and worse: the whole system of promotion from the ranks was 
discontinued. . . All in all, more than 10,000 or roughly one-third of the 
officers were removed over the next few years.48 
These drastic changes created a vacuum among the officer corps. The young officers 
were promoted to high ranks and posts. Although the isolation of the officers from 
politics was principally accepted by CUP and adopted at CUP congress more than once, 
there was a profound relation between the officers and the parliament: 
“The fact that relatively junior officers wielded great political influence 
through their positions in the CUP played havoc with the army discipline 
because the political hierarchy cut right through the military hierarchy of 
the officer corps.”49 
CUP, which was led by young officers, ruled the Empire from 1908, to 1918. It 
was the most difficult decade of the Empire, since the insulting Balkan defeat, World 
War I, and the demise of the Empire would take place in that 10 year.  
The interference of the military in the politics and the politicization of the army 
created an opposition organized an anti-CUP movement within the army and threatened 
an armed insurrection.50 This was the signals of the political polarization of the army 
leading to the most humiliating defeat of its history. 
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10. APoliticized Army and a Humiliating Defeat: Balkan Wars (1912–13) 
It was 1912 that allied Balkan states (Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro) 
started the war against the Empire, just one year after the Italians started a war against the 
Ottomans for the lands in the North Africa in 1911. Due to the developments of the 
recent years, there was a lack of strategic and tactic coherence among the Ottoman army. 
The new War Minister was unfamiliar with the plans; while the former Chief of Staff, 
who had drawn them up, was now serving in the Yemen.51 The first phase of the war was 
a humiliating defeat, in which the Bulgarian forces could come to the outskirts of 
Istanbul! Only after an armistice and the European intervention for balancing the power 
of the pro-Russian and pro-Austrian sides, could the Ottoman army regain some parts of 
the Turkish Europe. It was the second phase of the Balkan Wars, in 1913.  
11. Summary and Inferences in Terms of Civil Military Relations 
The relation between Turkish Army and the State, and its evolution in the 
historical perspective, can be summarized as; 
 The unification of the state and the army under the personality of the 
Sultan, 
 The unique loyalty of the military to the Sultan but to no other entity, 
 The privilege: the tradition of military men becoming state men,   
 The army as an element of disorder in the Empire,   
 The dire need for reforms and the resistance from the army, 
 Transformation of the resistance and reactions into military intervention,  
 The modernization of the army and the new education system on liberal 
thought, 
 The army as a force, demanding a constitutional change in the regime, 
Those are the phases of the evolution of the Turkish Army and its role in the state 
politics through the Ottoman history. 
Regarding the fact that the founders of the new Turkish republic were the officers 
of the Ottoman Army and were imbued with the reformist thoughts of the 19th century, it 
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can be understood that the foundation of the new Turkish Republic and its new army 
were naturally affected by the evolution of this military-state interaction. 
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IV. CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 
(1918–1960) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. Mustafa Kemal’s Leadership for the Independence 
Turkish Republic was founded in 23 October 1923, by a military cadre who were 
the leading actors of the independence process of 1918–1923. Mustafa Kemal (who later 
would be named as ATATURK, the father of the Turks) was the founding father of this 
process. He was originally an officer in the Ottoman Army who served in critical fronts 
like Canakkale (Gallipoli) in the 1st World War, after which he gained a heroic 
reputation.  
After the war, Allied powers signed a derogatory treaty (Sevres) with the Sultan 
of the Ottoman Empire in 1920, which almost ignored the existence of the Turks in the 
Anatolia, yet alone consolidating the Empire’s sovereignty. Istanbul was invaded by 
European powers; moreover, French, Italian, Greek and British armies were marching in 
the Turkish soils in Anatolia. This treaty and developments bolstered the efforts for 
independence, which had been organized under the leadership of the famous general, 
Mustafa Kemal since 1919.  
Mustafa Kemal, as an inspector vested with broad authority over the armies and 
provinces, was sent to Anatolia in 1919, by the Sublime Porte (Ottoman Government) to 
inspect and prevent any mobilization against the existence of the Allied soldiers. From 
the very first day of his duty, Mustafa Kemal sent messages to the provinces all over the 
country, and informed them about the situation in Istanbul and the way to save the 
country. He planned several meetings in strategic locations of Anatolia, and called for the 
representatives from provinces. He turned out to be against the puppet government of 
Istanbul which was under the control of the Britain and Allied powers. Similarly he 
turned against the cause of his duty that was to quell any uprisings. He became the 
representative of a total mobilization in the country; a mobilization that never resorted to 
violence.  
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2. Mustafa Kemal and the Officer Corps 
Through this mobilization of the country against the Allied powers, Mustafa 
Kemal, as a famous general who had to resign and take off his uniform in order to serve 
his country in 1919, had always been supported by the officer corps. A new assembly 
was convened in 1920, which was mostly led by the officers of the 1st World War 
Ottoman army, primarily by Mustafa Kemal. As the new institutions of the emergent 
republic began to functioning, the officer corps became the most important channel of 
information from center to the peripheries.  
3. Unification of the Military and Politics 
Through the foundation processes, there was a similarity between the Ottoman 
State and the Turkish Republic in terms of civil military relations. The military and state 
was unified under the personality of the Ottoman Sultan in the 14th century. Similarly, the 
state and the military were unified under the entity of the assembly in the 20th century. 
The assembly was led by the generals (primarily Mustafa Kemal) who were wearing 
civilian suits.  
4. Reforms 
After the independence wars, which solidified the leadership of Mustafa Kemal 
and sent the foreign armies away from the country, the treaty of Lausanne was signed 
with the Allied powers in 1923. The proclamation of the Republic was made in the 29 
October 1923, and reforms gained speed afterwards. While new institutions were 
established, the old ones were being abolished, and many other reforms were being 
undertaken gradually. But meanwhile, an opposition movement had aroused in the 
Assembly. Since the abolishment of the Sultanate and the Caliphate (the leader of the 
Muslims on the Earth), there were suspicions about an imminent tyranny or dictatorship 
of Mustafa Kemal. Based on these suspicions, a “second group,” who were not 
supporting Mustafa Kemal’s ideals, came into existence in the assembly. However, he 
 31
wanted to establish a structure based on more than personality, something that would 
outlast his death.52 
As a summary, although the unification of the personality of Mustafa Kemal and 
the national movement was based on the personal charisma of Mustafa Kemal as a 
soldier, the developments that led to the foundation of a new republic necessitated the 
isolation from military personality. As he resigned from a powerful military post in 1919 
in an eastern province of Turkey to serve for his country in terms of a civilian struggle, he 
also embraced and showed the difference between the soldier and the statesman. As he 
ascended the stairs of his political career he emphasized the necessity for isolation of the 
military from politics. From his time on, this isolation became one of the main traditions 
of the officer corps and affected the civil military relations of Turkey in a positive way.     
B. ISOLATION OF THE OFFICER CORPS FROM POLITICS 
1. “Absorbing” the Officer Corps into Politics 
Although, there was not a notion of an isolation of the military from politics in the 
initial years of the republic, it became an obligation in the next years. This was a gradual 
process, accelerated by the introduction of a law that necessitated the resignation from 
either military or parliament, and ended with the resignation of the remaining politicians 
from their military posts in 1927.53 
The army, which had played a key role in the founding of the Turkish Republic, 
continued to play its role by the officers taking part in critical political posts in the 
government. Similarly, Mustafa Kemal wanted to keep the military under control instead 
of completely isolating it from the politics. As an example, he insisted that the Cabinet 
should include the Chief of General Staff as a full-fledged member. Moreover, one was 
able to see that the Chief of the general Staff serving concurrently as Prime Minister 
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during a critical period from January 24, until July 10, 1922, which proved the existence 
of an intertwined civil military interaction.54 
2. Gradual Isolation 
Ataturk’s (Mustafa Kemal) management capability had played a big role in civil 
military relations in such a contradictory atmosphere. If he were not meticulous in his 
moves, the tension between the military elite and the state would deteriorate. That is why 
it gains importance to examine his steps on civil military relations to a better 
understanding of the process.  
He firstly undertook a gradual purge of the military to comb out some of the 
senior generals who had no interest in his ideals. Accordingly, at the end of May 1923 a 
group of prominent generals, who did not actively participate in the independence wars, 
retired from their posts.55 These retirements showed the power of the politics inside the 
army and the power of the army in the politics.   
A new crisis was started when some of the deputies who had been prominent 
generals in the army requested active military commands in addition to their civilian 
mandate deputies. It was not unusual for the officers to be a deputy simultaneously. But, 
it was a time that the parliament was becoming bipolarized and those generals had 
indicated before that, while they wholeheartedly supported the independence struggle, 
they did not always agree with Ataturk’s methods of operation. Ataturk finally assigned 
them to critical military posts.56 
3. Prerogative of the Military 
Military was always at the center of the consideration for any reform or a major 
change in the system. Just nine days before the proclamation of the Republic, Mustafa 
Kemal wanted the cabinet to secure a substantial pay raise for the armed services. 
Similarly, just before abolishing the religious office of Caliphate, he made a trip to Izmir 
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to test the atmosphere of the military at close hand during the war games. He spent two 
months there, with intensive contacts with the Chief of General Staff and other key 
military leaders.These were the proofs of his extra ordinary sensitivity in conciliating 
with military.57 
Immediately after the proclamation of the Republic, the actual isolation started. 
With the new regulations of the Assembly, the Chief of the General Staff was dropped 
from the Cabinet and directly put under the president. Another regulation was demanding 
that, henceforth officers on active duty must resign before running for parliament—only 
those who were currently deputies being exempt from the restriction. After that, the 
prominent generals who had active military duties, had to resign from their military 
offices.58 Thus, the military power of the opposition group in the Assembly was 
decreased.  
This incident did not yet bring the formal divorce of the military from the political 
arena, since there were still three generals in the Assembly: President Ataturk, Prime 
Minister Inonu, and Minister of Defense KazimOzalp. Moreover, The Prime Minister and 
the Minister of Defense were promoted to full-general while they were fully engrossed in 
political issues. It was only in 1927 that these last three soldier-deputies retired from their 
military offices, and the Assembly became completely civilian.59 
4. Loyalty of the Military 
It is important to note that, General Fevzi Çakmak (later Marshal), who had 
shown an unquestionable loyalty to Ataturk, served for two decades as the Chief of the 
General Staff, from 1924 until 1944. Thus, until the Second World War, the Army with 
General Çakmak, played a compliant role with the government. 
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C. DEMOCRATIC INCENTIVES 
1. One-Party System 
Throughout the foundation process of the new republic, the mobilization and the 
independence movements were always directed under a group of elected representatives, 
whose program was designed by Mustafa Kemal. He always chose to play the game 
according to the rules. One of the famous expressions of him was “Sovereignty belongs 
to the people,” which dominated the Assembly hereafter. After the convention of the 
Assembly, he formed Republican Peoples Party (RPP) against the “second group” who 
came to existence as an ineffective opposition. RPP governed the country until 1950, 
when the first fair and free elections took place in Turkey. According to some scholars 
like Zurcher, it was a one-party dictatorship, since state and the party was closely 
identified.60 However, in 1925 and 1930, there were two attempts for a transition to 
multi-party system. Since the political conditions of the country were not ready, the 
attempts failed.  
1920’s and 1930’s in the Turkish history were replete with reforms, running the 
gamut, from abolition of the Sultanate to modern dress codes, from abolition of the 
Caliphate to the replacement of the Arabic alphabet with the Latin one. Those reforms 
draw an outline of Mustafa Kemal’s dream; as he declared, he was dreaming a Turkey as 
a member of the “contemporary civilization.”61Becoming a member of contemporary 
civilization, by no means, necessitated to model the new country on Western values. 
Briefly, becoming a member of the contemporary civilizations was the initial democratic 
incentive. 
2. Social Structure 
There were major changes in the social structure of the new Republic. The 
reforms of the 1920’s eradicated the autonomy of the religion and religious institutions 
over the ruling elite. Moreover, the motivation for education created a group of middle 
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class businessmen and professional men as an alternative to the officer cadre. Although it 
was a slow process, the steadily decreasing number of retired officers serving in the 
Assembly, was another important factor about the social change in the power structure.62 
The changes in the social structure of military in that era is also worthy of 
consideration. The promotion system was almost stopped, since vacancies in the high 
ranks occurred only by death, retirement, or resignation. The resignation in young ranks 
was nearly impossible due to the long term of service required of commissioned officers. 
On the other hand, the army continued to attract new blood in terms of providing ardent 
youth to the military high schools, despite the erosion of the military predominance over 
the society. Over time, the freezing of the top ranks while accepting new recruits at the 
bottom inclined to instigate reaction among the junior officers. Moreover, cadets of the 
military academy compulsorily participated in lessons like radical social reform. This 
kind of education, although seemed superficial, tended to keep the military in the center 
of Turkish intellectual thought with a reformist tendency.63 
Another factor that affected a social change in the army was the alliance with the 
USA in 1948. As of this date, Turkey-USA military relations intensified, and thousands 
of officers sent abroad for training in many countries. Those officers, who were educated 
abroad and exposed to the sophisticated systems, realized the difference between their 
own system and the modern ones. Ultimately, they tended to lose respect for their more 
traditionally-minded superiors, which granted a new impetus to the long-standing ferment 
within the officer corps.64 
The new developments of the social structure of the new Republic and the 
military, brought about a parallel change. The Democrat Party, which garnered the 
majority of the votes in 1950 elections, was representing the social change of the country. 
On the other hand, the first military coup of modern Turkish history in 1960 represented 
the outcome of the social change in the military.  
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3. International Encouragements for Democratization 
In a very general sense, the defeat of the Axis powers in the Second World 
War was in itself a victory for democratic values.65 
Accordingly, Turkey’s positioning itself among the West, signing the UN charter 
in the San Francisco Conference in 1945, and being a member to NATO in 1952 were 
interpreted as an acceptation of democratic values by Turkey.  
4. Transition to Democratic Elections (1945–50) 
The new President of Turkey, the national leaderIsmet Inonu, took the power 
after Ataturk’s death, in 1938. In a few years Second World War began and had a 
destructive effect on the country. Under the severe conditions of the War, the government 
applied marginal measures. 1942 Wealth Tax (varlikvergisi) was one of them. Although 
its main victims were the non-Muslim businessmen, it caused unrest among the Turkish 
bourgeoisie as well. The other poor infrastructural conditions like living without 
electricity in major towns deteriorated the situation. Widespread discontent prevailed. 
Inonu, who was aware of this unrest, and remembering Ataturk’s “tutelary democracy” 
experience in 1930, he decided to allow a decree for political liberalization.66 
The first organized opposition took place in 1945. Four deputies from RPP 
prepared the famous “Memorandum of Four,” which was initially intended to make a 
reform in RPP, but later turned out to be organization an opposition party. The leader of 
the four was a landowner, Adnan Menderes, whose revenues were also deteriorated 
within recent years. The party rejected the proposal. However, when the four were 
supported by liberal media and their thoughts were taken into the newspapers, President 
Inonu made a speech, stressing that the main obstacle on the way to democracy was the 
absence of an opposition.67 
The elections were held in 1946, the new Democrat Party (of the four) gained 62 
of the 465 seats in the Assembly. It was not a small success. However, it was later 
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understood that there had been a massive vote rigging in the elections. The unrest became 
widespread. Democrat Party reaped this position for several years. In 1950, the first fair 
and free elections took place; there was a high rate of turnout, like 80 percent. Democrat 
Party took 408 of the 465, and Republican People’s Party could take 69 seats. The first 
free and fair experience of Turkey with democracy was that election. 
5. Democrat Party and the Army 
Despite the organic relation between the military and the RPP through the one-
party era, there were dissident officers who were pleased at the emergence of the 
Democrat Party. When the inter-party tensions were at peak in 1947, a formal military 
officers group gathered in the Staff College, in Istanbul. This group decided a military 
coup in 1949, for a revolution in politics. They sounded out their aim to a high level 
General in the same year. However, he refused and stopped them from a coup attempt.68It 
was a proof of a growing interest towards the emergent party among the high level 
generals.  
6. Subordination to Civilian Authority after 3 Decades 
The military, which was an unparalleled actor in the Turkish politics, was under a 
supreme coherence in favor of the single RPP, or simply the state. However, the 
emergence of the DP and accordingly the polarization in the army crippled this 
coherence. This process ended up with the success of the civilian authority. That was why 
the Chief of the General Staff was replaced only a few weeks after the DP won the 
elections, in 1950. In a few months, most of the generals, who supported the new party, 
became disillusioned with the new administration. With the resignation of the Cabinet 
members with military backgrounds, the Chief of General Staff had no representative in 
touch with the thinking of the military to voice its desires in the Cabinet.69 Throughout 
the ten-year period, the Chiefs of General Staffs and the Cabinet worked compatibly. 
Turkish military had never been so isolated from politics for the last five decades. It was 
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an isolation that the young officers were not happy with, due to the deteriorating quality 
of life in in terms of low income level of the officer corps.     
D. INSTITUTIONAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 
1. Military Institution  
In the first years of the Republic, the most coherent institution was military. That 
was why it had been used as an introductive organ of progressive practices, or an 
instrument for the spread of the reforms that Mustafa Kemal thought vital. Moreover, it 
was the “guardian of the regime” which would be used for many decades.70 
In one of his visit to an Anatolian town, Mustafa Kemal made a speech, which 
was enough to manifested the institutional role of the military in the first decades of the 
Republic:  
“Whenever the Turkish nation has wanted to take a step up, it has always 
looked at the army . . . as the leader of the movements to achieve lofty 
national ideals . . . When speaking of the army, I am speaking of the 
Intelligentsia of the Turkish nation who are the true owners of this country 
. . . The Turkish nation . . . considers its army the guardian of its ideals.”71 
2. General Staff under the Prime Minister, 1944 
The mobilization of the Second World War revealed the defects of the Turkish 
Army in terms of preparedness and planning. Moreover, the position of the army in the 
politics, which was represented by Marshal Cakmak’s quite easily interactions with the 
politicians, became subject to inconvenience among the politicians. As soon as he retired 
in 1944, the new general who replaced him complied with the politicians about a re-
positioning of the military in the politics. Ultimately, the Chief of General Staff was 
subordinated to the Prime Minister under injunction to deal directly with the other 
ministries in case.72 
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3. General Staff under the Ministry of Defense, 1949 
While competing for the elections of 1950, both parties, DP and RPP, did not 
abstain from giving voice to downgrade the establishment of the military establishment. 
Thus, RPP in May 1949 had finally moved the General Staff under the Ministry of 
Defense to ensure stronger civilian control over the military. At the same time a National 
defense Council was established in order to coordinate all defense matters.73 
4. Membership to the European Council, 1949 
Turkey’s two-hundred-year-old history of Westernization became the source of 
the membership to the Council, which was accepted as a significant step. It was also a 
step of ‘institutional integration’ of Turkey into the Western World just after the Second 
World War. It had more symbolic and psychological importance for Turkey rather than 
pragmatic significance.74    
5. Military and the Economy 
The military, with a role that was explained above, played an important role in the 
Economy. Marshal Cakmak, the Chief of General Staff, was attending to the Cabinet 
meetings and he enjoyed a direct access to all government and parliamentary leaders, 
many of whom were former officers.75 
The co-existence of the politicians and the Chief of General Staff concluded in a 
structure where military has a say in almost everything. From location of the factories to 
the building of roads and railroads were mostly implemented after consulting to the 
military. In 1930’s the economic development program was highly affected by the 
military considerations. Ironically, in these years there had been a decrease in the portion 
of the military in the national budget. However, it was not because of civilian supervision 
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over the military budget but due to the static defense concept espoused by Marshal 
Cakmak.76 
6. Institutional Perceptions 
The mid 1950s were morally and materially difficult years for the officer corps. 
The power structure was completely changing, with the motto of the government,” a 
millionaire in every quarter,” and an emerging middle class were monopolizing wealth 
and status in society. As an example, the inadequacy of the payments came to a point 
that, in 1956, one third of the commissioned officers had left the military for that reason. 
The attitude of the politicians towards the military was bitter. In 1954, the prime minister 
was widely quoted as saying that he could run the army with reserve officers if he 
wanted. It instigated unparalleled recoil among the regular officers. Lastly, the religious 
tendencies of the government also disturbed the military regarding the damage to the 
reform program initiated by Atatürk.77 It was mostly based on the special rights given to 
the minorities which appeared to threaten the bases of national unity which Atatürk had 
exerted such an effort. These kinds of institutional discomfort, created some reactionary 
movements organized by young officers in the army. The initial intention of those cliques 
was just a reform in the military; however, with the economic crisis of 1957 and the 
political strife brought about a military coup as a tendency among these cliques.78 The 
arrest of the nine officers in 1957 due to an alleged coup plot, which was publicized one 
year later, revealed the irregularity between the two institutions of the state.79     
E. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE 1960 MILITARY COUP 
It was understood that a military coup had taken place at three o’clock in the 
morning, when a declaration was broadcast on Turkish Radio later in the morning of 27 
May 1960. The coup was planned and carried out by the colonel-level junior officers and 
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led by a retired Army Commander. The President, Prime Minister, several members of 
the Cabinet, the Chief of the General Staff, and the previous Chiefs of the General Staff 
were arrested. Prime minister and several cabinet members were executed after a trial in 
1961. Except the execution of the politicians, the coup was almost bloodless.     
1. Erosion in the Commitment to Democracy: Pressure on Press and 
Opposition 
The main cause of the 1960 coup was escalating tension between the government 
and opposition that threatened to erupt into a civil war. Just after he was firstly elected in 
1950, Adnan Menderes built on the liberalization policy that followed Atatürk’s death in 
1938. The relaxation of the laws that restricted the role of minorities and Islam was one 
of them. Menderes administration repeatedly passed legislation designed to restrict 
freedom of press, since a strong Kemalist opposition was vastly supported by the press. 
Anything “designed to damage the political or financial prestige of the state,” or 
“belittling persons holding official positions” was subject to investigation. This kind of 
frictions increased in his second term in the late 1950s. Polarized public opinion led to 
violent clashes in 1959, which was fuelled by the growing hostilities between the 
government and opposition supporters. One year later, in April 1960, university 
campuses were paralyzed by a series of large-scale student demonstrations, which led to 
bloody confrontations with police forces. Neither the confinement of the demonstrators 
nor the imposition of martial law could restore the civil order. As Tachau and Heper 
asserted; 
the regime assumed the character of a ‘guardian’ regime i.e., one which took 
control of the government for the purpose of preserving (or re-establishing) the 
status-quo. . . It is significant that the coup occurred primarily in response to the 
strong indications that the government’s commitment to democratic procedures 
had seriously eroded.80 
2. Developments to the Detriment of Military 
After the death of Atatürk, Turkish General Staff, which had been accustomed to 
have a say in politics, was isolated from interaction with the politicians and politics. 
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There were several reasons for that. Firstly, the effect of the personal charisma of the 
Chief of the General Staff Marshal Fevzi Çakmak (who had been in the post for the 
longest term in Turkish history—two decades) would be exceeded by no other general at 
the time.  
Secondly, with the rhetoric of a more democratic administrative system and a 
multi-party elections, and with the emergence of an opposition who had rhetoric against 
the power of the military in the politics, diminishing the influence of the Turkish General 
Staff in politics became an election issue. That was why in 1959, just one year before the 
first fair and free elections of Modern Turkish history, the government who was in the 
power for three decades, subordinated the Turkish General Staff to the Ministery of 
Defense. 
Thirdly, the emergence of new middle class elite different from the officer corps 
and their inclusion into the system, which was accustomed to be fed by the retired 
officers, diminished the number of active politicians or bureaucrats whose previous 
profession had been in the military. Thus, the organic relation between the military and 
the governmental institutions weakened. 
Lastly, during 1950s, the salaries and working conditions of the officer corps 
deteriorated and the Democrat Party frequently interfered in military postings and 
promotions.81 Moreover, a rumor about the Prime Minister concerning his belittling 
remarks about the army, created a discomfort among the officer corps.     
F. ASSESSMENT OF THE VARIABLES 
1. Isolation from Politics 
The Beginning: Absorbing the Officers into the Politics! 
The fact that the foundation of the republic was based on a military 
cadre had unified the officers and the politicians in a complicated way. Moreover, 
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Mustafa Kemal wanted to keep the military under control instead of completely isolating 
it from the politics. It was not an unfamiliar scene that an officer voting in the assembly 
as a politician with his uniform; a Cabinet, including the Chief of General Staff as a full-
fledged member; even, the Chief of the General Staff serving concurrently as Prime 
Minister for six months, which proved the existence of an intertwined civil military 
interaction.82 Moreover, the leading politicians mostly had military backgrounds. Thus, 
there was an organic connection between military and politics.  
Loyalty to the Civilian Authority 
For the first two decades of the new Republic military was loyal to 
the political organization due to the personal loyalty of the Chief of the General Staff. 
However, it enjoyed a privilege of involving into politics. It was due to the existence of 
the charismatic personality, Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, until 1944. None of his successors 
could enjoy such a privilege. His retirement co-existed with the multi-party transition 
process. Thus, his successors became subject to political rallies and rhetoric between the 
parties, in terms of diminishing the military influence on the politics. However, the 
loyalty of military went on. In that era, the high-level military cadre compatibly worked 
with the Democrat Party government. On the other hand that loyalty could be explained 
in terms of political tendencies of the generals. Whatever the reason could be, the result 
was that the military and the political organizations worked compatibly in the first period.  
  Legislative Regulations for Isolation 
The removal of the military from cabinet and repositioning under 
the direct control of the president was the first legislative attempt for isolation. This 
change not only kept the military from direct daily political debates, but also provided a 
supporting force for the president.  
The decree that necessitated the resignation from the military post 
to become a politician was another step towards the isolationist tradition. One of the 
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reasons of that legislative maneuver could be weakening the opposition, but eventually it 
became a step of the gradual isolation.     
The repositioning of the Chief of the General Staff under the Prime 
Minister just after the retirement of the Marshal, in 1944, was another move to eradicate 
the privilege of the military. The re-adjustment of the military’s position in 1949, putting 
under the Minister of the Defense, proved the political will to water down the military 
influence in those years.  
Implications  
The first period of our study, 1918–1960, was characteristically 
diverse regarding the isolation from politics. this period may be characterized as:  
 Initially direct and organic connection between military and 
civilians, 
 Partly isolation of the officer corps from politics, by legislative 
regulations,  
 A constant loyalty to the political authority, 
- Marshal Fevzi Çakmak’s two-decade term as the Chief of the 
General Staff, 
- Existence of a privileged position for the military, 
 The introduction of the multi-party system:  
- More moderate and democratic civil military relations,    
- The isolation of the top brass officer corps from politics.  
 Civil military balance could not prevent the military coup of the 
young officers, 
- The resentment of the officer corps in general,  
- Lack of the isolation from politics among the young officers 
who performed the military coup.   
2. Democratic Incentives  
One-party Era 
As a summary, despite the democratic incentives, Turkey was 
ruled under a one-party rule for almost three decades, which cannot be accepted as 
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democracy. In the meantime, there were two attempts for a multi-party system (1925–
30), and the reforms showed their effects by creating a social change on the new 
generation that ultimately accelerated the transition to democracy. The actual transition 
took place in between 1945–1950.83 
Social Reforms as Investments to Future Democracy 
The most important democratic incentive of that period was the 
reforms and the change in the social structure which affected the next decades of the 
country in terms of transition to democracy. 
The social structure had dramatically changed in that era. It was 
due to the social reforms that aimed at making Turkey a member of the contemporary 
civilizations. The change of alphabet from Arabic to Latin script, electoral reforms in 
favor of females and many other reforms had been highly effective in imbuing the youth 
with motives of modern life.  
Positioning in the West 
Turkey’s relations with Western world accelerated in that era. 
Turkey became a member of the United Nations, European Council, NATO and some 
regional organizations which were supported by the West in terms of bipolar struggle 
between the West and the East. Especially the membership to the NATO and becoming a 
close ally to USA had a dramatic change in the military system, and the officer corps. 
The new techniques and tactics of the new warfare and the different institutional 
traditions affected the young officers in Turkish army. It was also a social change within 
the army, which led to the 1960 military coup. Thus, the social change in the officer 
corps had a drastic effect in civil military relations in Turkey.   
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Implications 
 One-party system could not be accepted as a democratic regime 
despite the two multi-party attempts in 1925 and 1930. However, 
most of the democratic motives were invested under the one-party 
administration.  
 The social reforms including the introduction of a western life style 
and education system, created a tremendous social change in 
1930s.  
 After the Second World War, the integration of Turkey to the 
Western world took place. The new memberships to the new 
organizations proved the Turkish will to stand with the democratic 
regimes.  
 Soon after came the multi-party elections of 1950, which created a 
democratic era in terms of civil military relations.  
3. Institutional and Economic Developments 
Institutional Responsibility of the Military 
The foundation of the new republic was led by the officers and the 
leading politicians of the first two decades were mostly originated from military. 
Moreover, there was an organic and direct relation between military elite and the 
governing elite. Naturally, the mission of the military was clearly defined as the guardian 
of the modernization and progress. This was clearly stated by Mustafa Kemal in a public 
speech in Konya. Military was also effective in economic decisions, since the new 
projects like railroad constructions or new factories were consulted to the military before 
activation. After the death of Mustafa Kemal in 1938 and the retirement (after a two-
decade-long tenure) of the first Chief of the General Staff in 1944, the balance between 
civilians and military began to change in favor of the civilians.   
Important Changes for Subordination of the Military 
In 1944, just after the retirement of the first Chief of the General 
Staff Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, the government manifested its discomfort about the present 
civil military relations by subordinating the military under the prime minister. This was a 
drastic change in terms of the institutional role of the military. Five year later, in 1949, 
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civilians took one step more against the military and the military was put under the 
minister of defense. These two institutional changes were landmarks of the civil military 
relations background of Turkey.  
Implications 
 The institutional role of the military was the guardianship of the 
modernization and progress.  
 The military had a decisive role even in economics.  
 The active presence of the military on the institutional realm of the 
civilians began to fade after the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
and the retirement of the first chief of the general staff. 
  The military was subordinated under the prime minister, and five 
years later under the minister of defense.  
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V. CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUPS 
(1960–1980) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This period was marked with the direct military intervention of 1960, which 
changed the constitution thoroughly, and limited the capabilities of a government. After 
the coup, the Prime Minister and his several Cabinet members were executed at the end 
of a trial.  
The 1960 coup was organized and carried out by junior officers in colonel level. 
Therefore, the coup was accepted as a revolutionary action within the army. However, the 
coherence of the military elite did not last long. After the coup, the military ruling elite 
divided into two fractions; one was pro-parliamentarian, the other fraction was pro-
authoritarian. The struggle ended with the victory of the pro-parliamentarian side. 
In 1962 and 1963, there were two more coup attempts. They were quelled and the 
leading figure was executed. The constitutional changes, which turned the government 
into an incapable institutional body and almost locked the political institutions, 
necessitated another constitutional amendment to ameliorate the authority of the 
government. 
On 12 March 1971, the Chief of the General Staff handed the Prime Minister a 
memorandum, which was accepted as an ultimatum by the military. It demanded that a 
strong and a credible government be established that would be able to end the anarchy. If 
the demands were not met, the army would perform its ‘constitutional’ duty. The 
politicians did what was deemed necessary by the military, but the political violence and 
economic crisis never ended until 1980 military coup. 
 On the morning of 12 September 1980, the armed forces announced that they had 
taken the political power since the state institutions had stopped functioning. The 
announcement was read at 04:30 hours in the morning and also said that the parliament 
was dissolved, the cabinet had been deposed, and the immunity of the members of the 
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assembly had been lifted. The party leaders were arrested, a state of emergency was 
declared, and no one was allowed to leave the country.  
“In the first six weeks after the coup 11,500 people were arrested; by the end of 
1980 the number had grown to 30,000 and after one year 122,600 arrests had been 
made. By September 1982, two years after the coup, 80,000 were still in prison, 
30,000 of them awaiting trial . . . the positive affect . . . was that the number of 
politically motivated terrorist attacks diminished by over 90 percent.”84 
The period between 1960 and 1980 witnessed drastic changes in the institutional 
structure of the country, created by the constitutional amendments which were initiated 
by the military intervention of 1960.   
1. Shift of Power after 1960 
After the 1960 intervention, the military elite returned the civilian authority back 
to civilians in a fast way. The effect of the direct military regime was only for more than 
a year. The democratic values and the need for isolation from politics were driving forces 
for the shift of power, while the broad constitutional change in terms of institutional 
development accelerated the process, since it was the goal of the military elite to put an 
end to the excessive authority of a majority government.  
2. The Motive behind the “Soft” 1971 Intervention 
The motive behind the 1971 was the constitutional confusion that left the 
government almost powerless. The only aim of the military was to regulate the political 
system in terms of constitutional amendments. The institutional developments were the 
driving force of the military while the democratic values and the isolation of the military 
from politics were the factors that rendered the coup as a “soft” one.   
B. ISOLATION OF THE OFFICER CORPS FROM POLITICS 
1. The Initial non-Partisan Character of the 1960 Coup 
There are different views in terms of the political tendencies of the military elite. 
Zürcher claimed that they were non-Partisan since they claimed to be above the parties: 
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The general public became aware that a military coup d’etat had taken place at 
three o’clock in the morning of 27 May 1960 only when a declaration read by 
Colonel Alparslan Türkeş was broadcast on Turkish radio later that morning. The 
statement announced that the Turkish armed forces had taken over the 
administration of the country ‘to prevent fratricide’ and to ‘extricate the parties 
from the irreconcilable situation into which they had fallen.’ The declaration 
emphasized the non-partisan character of the coup.85    
Karpat claimed that the military elite were coordinating with civilians, especially 
with the politicians of RPP.86 Since the official and written scripts support the first idea, 
we had to accept that the military coup of 1960 was initially non-Partisan. However, the 
political tendencies of the leading personalities affected the relations with the parties in 
the following years. 
2. The Irony: Do Politics, in Order to Isolate from Politics!  
Some months after the coup, the high ranking officers became worried about 
military matters, since their hierarchical superiority was undermined by the young 
officers. That was why, the top brass of the armed forces founded Armed Forces Union 
(AFU), which interfered into politics by memoranda and warnings. The senior officers 
were right in their anxiety about new attempts by the juniors, since in 1962 and 1963, 
there were two abortive attempts, by another colonel. Eventually, the senior generals 
went on warning the government and announcing memoranda about politics, in order to 
keep the initiative and forestall independent action by radical officers.87 
It was an irony that, the senior officers were highly messed with the politics in 
order to isolate the junior officers from politics. They were successful to isolate the junior 
officers from open politics to an extent; on the other hand they created a new trend 
among the senior officers. However, this kind of warnings and memoranda became a 
tradition of Turkish civil military relations.  
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3. Negative Effects of Interventions to the Military Institution 
It was accepted as a decisive factor that institutional structure of the military was 
damaged after the interventions. First of all, the young officers also incline to intervene 
into politics, since there is a probability of a vertical promotion after the intervention. 
Additionally, this inclination of the new generation officer corps, destruct the hierarchical 
command and control system of the military institution. Thus, top brass members of the 
military regime were aware of that danger, which caused them to take measures to 
prevent any probable repetition of military intervention.   
One of the top brass generals of the 1980 military coup, Admiral Nejat Tümer, 
admitted that the promotion system of the institutional structure of the military was 
disrupted because of the military interventions. He added that military interventions could 
set things right only for the short term. Their long term effects are generally destructive 
for the military.88  
C. DEMOCRATIC INCENTIVES 
1. The Involvement of the Civilians 
1960 military intervention was far civilian in terms of cooperation and 
intercourse. From the very first day of the coup, the organizers summoned five professors 
from the İstanbul University in order to prepare a new constitution. This attempt is an 
indicator that the officers did not have a coherent intention of an autocracy, or a political 
system different from democracy.  
2. The purge of National Unity Committee (NUC) in 1960 
National Unity Committee (NUC) was established soon after the intervention, 
which was led by Gürsel who was vested with unique authority. The Committee was 
consisted of 38 officers and the leader, Gürsel. NU C was the governmental institution of 
the new administration, until the shift of power from military to the civilians. 
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There were two groups in the NUC, first group, which was led by a strong 
personality who also was the advisor to the president, favored drastic changes in military 
and political system; on the contrary, the second group, which was led by the president 
himself, was more moderate, favoring the parliamentarian system. The struggle ended 
with the victory of the second group. The first group was dispatched with appointments 
to the farthest locations as military attachés; for example the advisor to the president 
became the military attaché in New Delhi.89 
The purge in the NUC in 1960 was an indicator that the radicals who were 
demanding drastic changes in the political system of the country were no more effective. 
Conversely, the new NUC was comprised of the members who were favoring a 
parliamentarian system.   
3. Considering the “West” 
General Muhsin Batur, who was the Air Force Commander of the 1971 military 
interventions, wrote in his book that a group of officers proposed an outright military 
regime. He turned the idea down, considering the “West,” 
The Western world cannot accept this sort of system and procedure. It is just not 
good enough to say ‘if they don’t accept it, then so be it.’ If we give way (i.e., 
adopt the proposed plan) we will get support from the Eastern Bloc and Red 
China, but that would be a disaster for Turkey.90 
D. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
1. A New Institution: National Unity Committee (NUC) 
It was announced by the military that the power was now in the hands of National 
Unity Committee (NUC) which was established soon after the intervention. It was led by 
Gürsel who was vested with unique authority. It was consisted of 38 officers and the 
leader, Gürsel. NUC was the governmental institution of the new administration, until the 
shift of power from military to the civilians.  
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Although the armed forced as a whole sided with the organizers and coup, the 
NUC did not represent the same coherence within the committee. The advisor, Aşparslan 
Türkeş, who was known to have pan-Turkist sympathies, was the most influential 
member of the committee. He represented the group of officers who had no trust in 
politicians and wanted a thorough reform of the political system. This group, which was 
named as the radicals, made radical requests, which were approved neither by Gürsel nor 
by the other members. Eventually, Gürsel disbanded NUC in November 1960, and 
established a new institution, excluding the 14 radical members of the previous group. 
They were sent to military posts abroad.91  
2. An Institutional Role to the Military: National Security Council 
(NSC) 
The new constitution, prepared after the military coup, had given a role to the 
military by establishing an institution, National Security Council (NSC). The council, 
which was established with the introduction of the 1961 Constitution, mainly composed 
of the President, the Prime Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, Land, Air and Naval 
Forces Commanders, and ministers related with the national security. The NSC was 
chaired by the President, or in his absence, by Prime Minister. The extent and the 
effectiveness of the NSC were increased with the constitutional amendments of 1973 and 
1982 Constitution. Until quite recently, the complicated structure of appointed officials 
and politicians supposed to be de facto ruling organization of the country. The 
governments were supposed to give priority consideration to the decisions of the NSC 
meetings.92   
3. Professors and Their Effects in the Afterwards 
From the beginning, the military leadership was convinced that more than a 
simple government change was necessary. 27 May 1960 was the date of the military 
intervention; ironically it was the date of the intervention of academics into the 
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administration. On the very same day, five law professors from the University of Istanbul 
were invited to prepare a new constitution. They prepared a provisional constitution after 
which they legitimized the military intervention in terms of law. While they justified the 
military coup, they blamed the DP being unconstitutional. Ironically, this legitimization 
brought the confrontation of the NUC and the DP, which damaged the announced non-
partisan character of the NUC.93 Thus, the two institutions of the state NUC and one of 
the main political organizations of the country confronted.    
4. A Soft Balance between the Academics and the Military 
The road map of the intervention was well-planned. The organizers successfully 
took over the effective posts like command of the garrisons before the coup. They finally 
found a senior leader, Cemal Gürsel, who was the former commander-in-chief of the land 
forces, and who didn’t have a good relation with the government. However, after the 
intervention there was a vacuum of authority in the state. As a solution, Cemal Gürsel 
had been appointed head of state, prime minister, and minister of defense which was 
matchless in Turkish history.94  
In 27 May 1960, the military took the stage and took over all the government 
buildings in Ankara and İstanbul. All of the DP ministers were arrested, including the 
President, Prime Minister, and Chief of the General Stuff. In August, 235 out of 260 
generals and around 5000 colonels and majors were forced to retire from the army. In 
October, 147 university professors were sacked. These were probably due to the political 
tendencies of the officials towards the ousted government. All of the rectors of the 
Turkish universities resigned. The outcry and the extent of the protests of the academics 
had embarrassed the military leaders and soon a negotiating process began. Eventually 
the university teachers were restored to their positions.    
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5. New Constitution via a Stunning Referendum 
The restriction on political activity was lifted on January 1961, and eleven new 
parties were registered. The most important one was the Justice Party, which was led by a 
retired general, and which played a role close to the DP. The new constitution was more 
liberal than the previous one, in the sense that it tolerated a wider spectrum of political 
activity than before, both to the left and to the right. The new constitution set forth that 
there should be a referendum. It was held on July 1961 nearly one year after the military 
intervention, the referendum took place for the new constitution. The results were 
stunning. There was nearly 40 percent counter vote, despite the strong propaganda in 
favor of the new constitution! This was a setback for the military elite. The second shock 
was the result of the parliamentary elections on October 1961. Because the new parties 
that would be accepted as the continuation or heir of the Democrat Party, had the 
strongest political support in the country.95     
6. A Different Intervention and the Constitutional Amendments 
The military, this time, did not oust the government by a military coup. The Chief 
of the General Staff handed a paper to the incumbent Prime Minister demanding that a 
strong and a credible government be formed which would be able to end the anarchy; 
otherwise, the army would ‘exercise its constitutional duty.’ The initial reaction of the 
politicians was negative in manner, but no more than passive responses; they resigned 
from their posts. However, in a short period of time they tended to bear a more 
conciliatory attitude. This intervention was followed with hope by the leftists, 
interpreting a similarity with the 1960 coup which was a junior-led operation against a 
right-wing government. On the contrary, it was planned and executed by the senior 
officers who were afraid of a communist threat, so it was a senior-led operation against 
the leftist movement.96  
Referring the indistinctness in the politics, the military wanted the parliament to 
form a powerful government. Actually, the 1971 intervention was aiming to restore the 
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governmental weaknesses created by 1960 constitution, which was written to prevent the 
hegemony of a single party supported by the majority. Only a powerful government 
would eradicate the anarchy and the chaotic atmosphere which was a product of the 
disabilities created by coalitions and minority governments. On that purpose, 44 
amendments were made in the constitution.97    
E. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE INTERVENTIONS 
1. 1971 Intervention 
On 12 March 1971, the Chief of the General Staff handed the Prime Minister a 
memorandum, which was accepted as an ultimatum by the military. It demanded that a 
strong and a credible government be established that would be able to end the anarchy. If 
the demands were not met, the army would perform its ‘constitutional’ duty. The initial 
reaction of the politicians was negative. However, they behaved conciliatory and made 
necessary reforms demanded by the military.  
2. Underlying Causes of the 1971 Intervention 
The next decade after the 1960 intervention, may be called as a tumultuous 
political era. Because there was no single party which could garner the majority of the 
votes, there was no effort for a strong coalition either. The increased number of the 
political parties divided the votes, and diminished the probability of a strong government. 
Leftist and rightist groups were making demonstrations. The street violence was rampant. 
On the other hand, the military often intervened into politics due to the new tradition of 
warnings. This process ended with the famous “warning” military intervention of 1971. 
The main cause of the 1971 intervention was political and anarchic disorder in the 
country for several years. As early as 1968, demonstrators were so widespread that the 
Prime Minister of Turkey interpreted the issue as manipulation of the “enemies,” who 
aimed at undermining the democracy in Turkey. However, in the following years, the 
escalation of the right-left violence associated with deterioration of the economy, which 
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ultimately paralyzed Turkish politics. Finally, violent demonstrations which were led by 
the student organizations and trade unions against new economic regulations, in June 
1970, resulted in the imposition of martial law in İstanbul.98  
The inability of the government was mainly due to the new regulations of the 
1961 constitution, which apparently aimed the restriction of the ‘freedom of action’ of the 
government. For example, the establishment of the second parliamentary chamber, the 
adoption of a new electoral system based on a strictly proportional system of 
representation, granting universities with broad autonomy, and establishment of a 
constitutional court with powers to invalidate governmental decrees and legislation.99 
However, the stance of the armed forces could be interpreted as “more moderate,” 
since the New Year’s address of the Chief of the General Staff of the time was focusing 
on the “responsibility of the constitutional bodies.” The civilian administration was either 
unable or unwilling to restore order. The first months of the 1970 were marked with 
bombings in every corner, sabotages against government buildings all around, or reports 
of a planned leftist insurrection. A memorandum came from the military, after some more 
criminal events took place in the beginning of March. In that memorandum, the situation 
of the country was reminded and it was mentioned that the goals that were put by Atatürk 
and the constitution were not met. Finally, the memorandum declared that there should be 
a strong and credible government to neutralize the anarchical situation. After the Prime 
Minister of the time resigned in 1971, the President welcomed the army: 
The President publicly thanked the High Command, declaring that it had acted 
responsibly and he urged all Turks to support the new government.100  
3. 1980 Intervention 
On the morning of 12 September 1980, the armed forces announced that they had 
taken the political power since the state institutions had stopped functioning. The 
announcement was read at 04:30 hours in the morning and also said that the parliament 
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was dissolved, the cabinet had been deposed, and the immunity of the members of the 
assembly had been lifted. The party leaders were arrested, a state of emergency was 
declared, and no one was allowed to leave the country.  
“In the first six weeks after the coup 11,500 people were arrested; by the end of 
1980 the number had grown to 30,000 and after one year 122,600 arrests had been made. 
By September 1982, two years after the coupo, 80,000 were still in prison, 30,000 of 
them awaiting trial . . . the positive affect . . . was that the number of politically motivated 
terrorist attacks diminished by over 90 percent.”101      
4. Underlying Causes of the 1980 Coup 
1970s were examples of uncertainty; state bureaucracy was highly politicized and 
intellectuals were divided according to their ideologies. The military was the only 
cohesive and uncorrupted state institution. The late 1970s were the years of street 
violence and clashes between the rightist and leftist youth. The country was brought to 
the brink of a civil war. On the other hand, the presidential elections in 1980, became a 
deadlock since the political parties were stubbornly impeding the other’s candidate to be 
elected. The politicians were far away from voting for a president in the Assembly, let 
alone dealing with the internal security. 
Constitutional Status and Responsibilities of the Military 
The legitimization of the 1980 coup was based on the article 35 of 
Law No. 211. Article 35 states:  
The duty of the Turkish Armed Forces is to protect and preserve the Turkish 
Homeland and the Turkish Republic as defined in the constitution.102  
The constitution defines Turkish Republic, in article 2, as: 
The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the 
rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of the public peace, national solidarity 
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and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and 
based on the fundamental tenet set forth in the Preamble.103 
Article 35 had been open to debate for years, whether it was a violation of 
constitution, since it gives the military the right to remove an elected government. A 
replacement of the elected government by the military is undemocratic; on the other 
hand, an elected government’s abuse of constitution is also a violation of constitution. 
The interpretation of the constitutional role of the Turkish military is a guarantor of the 
regime and domestic stability. Therefore, the military influence in the politics of Turkey 
has not been constant, and has varied according to the changes in the course of domestic 
political circumstances. The influence decreased during times of stability and confidence, 
and increased during times of uncertainty.104 
The Political and Economic Disorder 
1960 military coup was carried out by the young officers, who 
were no superior then colonels. It was both a reactionary and a revolutionary coup. It was 
reactionary because it was against the government, and ended up with the execution of 
the prime minister and his two cabinet members. It was revolutionary because the young 
officers revolted against the experienced generals. The explanatory reasons of the 
military coup, which was partly touched in the previous chapter, are out of this study. 
However, the reactionary and the revolutionary characteristics of this coup became highly 
effective in the next two decades, in which the course of modern Turkish history had 
been drastically changed.   
The main reason of the military coup was, one more time, lying 
beneath the political disorder of the late 1970s. The political instability was intermingled 
with the violence. On the one hand, extremists on the both sides resorted to murder; on 
the other hand, politicians reacted selectively, instead of attempting to repress this 
antidemocratic behavior. Ultimately, rightist political leader tended to excuse the rightist 
violence, while the left-wing political leader viewed the leftist attacks as legitimate 
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reactions to social injustice. The deteriorated economy co-existed with this gloomy 
atmosphere.105 Moreover, different from the existing left-wing / right-wing ideological 
warfare, diversion between the parties varied from Islamist fundamentalism to extreme 
rightist Nationalism. This diversion in politics made it more difficult to form a strong 
government. Ultimately, when the Assembly proved inability to elect a new president 
after more than 100 ballots, it was perceived that political squabbling was taking 
precedence over the national interest.106     
Organized Violence 
During the 1970s, political and economic disorder was a real 
problem. On the one hand leftists and rightists were fighting for the control of the streets 
and campuses; on the other hand Turkey’s economy which was depending on foreign 
investments and money, was becoming more fragile because of the general economic 
recession in the world and the oil crisis. Economic disorder and political violence 
deteriorated the social structure of the country in tandem. A mayor of a small town, 
called Fatsa, on the Black Sea, proclaimed a weird independence of a Soviet Republic; 
while the energy need, which was almost completely depending on oil, was becoming 
more problematic due to the oil crisis. The victims of the political violence was more than 
250 in 1977, drastically the number went up to more than 1200 in two years. Through the 
end of the decade, new political and ideological threats emerged. Marxist terrorist 
organization PKK was established in 1978. Facing the escalating level of the violence 
and economic inability, the government had to implement martial law in more than ten 
provinces; in a few years, this number doubled. 1970s were politically and economically 
devastating for the country, which necessitated the intervention of the military in 12 
September 1980.107   
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Military’s Active Role for Restoring the Order 
On the other hand, military was within the scene since 1978, in 
which martial law was imposed in thirteen out of sixty seven provinces. This number was 
nineteen in 1979, and twenty in 1980. Just before the military coup, one-fourth of the 
army was involved in restoring the civilian order. As for the officer corps, they had 
understood in 1975, that a new constitution was necessary. They even prepared in 1979 
for an intervention similar to the 1971. In December 1979, the High Command sent a 
letter to the President, urging the leaders to solve the problems democratically. On 1 
January 1980, a letter from the Chief of the General Staff was released, warning the 
administration about the anti-terrorist measures. A week later, an announcement of over 
sixty political demands was published which faded away under the political squabbling. 
Moreover, one week before the military coup, the Islamist fundamentalist party leader 
made a speech about restoring the Shariah (Islamist order); one day later, the left-wing 
leader gave a speech inviting the trade union members to take violent action if they felt 
injustice existed. In a week, military took the stage with the 1980 military coup.108       
Geo-Strategic Necessities for a NATO Member 
The end of the 1970s and the early 1980s were the years of 
conflicts and problems all over the world. Afghan invasion of Russia, Iran revolution, 
military intervention in Pakistan, Lebanon invasion of Israel and many other problems 
were taking place around Turkey, which was the only NATO member of the region. 
Therefore, the stability of Turkey was more important in global terms than it was 
domestically. Thus, the political violence and the economic problems of the country 
worried the West. It was manifested in some official reports and statements of the 
Western states like the USA and England. A short report prepared by Paul Henze for the 
White House indicated that: 
The military are planning to introduce a presidential system with their new 
constitution. Increased executive powers of the president will be followed by new 
legislation on electoral and parties law to introduce a two-party and first pass the 
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post system . . . This intervention of the Turkish Armed Fırces should be 
supported openly by the United States.109 
F. ASSESSMENT OF THE VARIABLES 
1. Isolation from Politics 
The Necessity for non-Partisan Character  
Although different authors made different assessments whether the 
coup was partisan or non-partisan, the official rhetoric and the initial actions proved that 
the intervention did not have a political tendency, at least initially. There are several 
reasons for that.  
First of all, tendency for a political party would cause a political 
polarization within the army, in which there were definitely pro-RPP and pro-DP officers 
as well. This would also cause the destruction of the hierarchical command and control, 
which was experienced just after the 1960 coup. Second, the legitimization of the military 
intervention would be debatable in the perspective of the people who voted for DP. Third, 
it would also damage the understandability of the intervention in the international 
political arena.    
Politicized Strategic Command for Depoliticizing the Tactic Level  
The revolutionary character of the 1960 coup, proved that the 
young officers, who had been educated in a different system, had a potential to revolt 
against the will of the senior officers in the military. Therefore, the senior officers had to 
create a new tradition to prevent the young generation from taking part in a possible 
coup. They founded an institution (Armed Forces Union (AFU)) in order to warn the 
political actors, so that the young officers would have no reason to deal with politics. 
Ironically, the senior officers were getting into politics in order to prevent the juniors 
from getting into politics, which marked the beginning of a new form of civil military 
relations, by continuous warnings from military as the guardian of the state and the 
regime.     
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New Measurements to Depoliticize the Junior Officers  
The curriculums at the military schools, especially in the war 
academy, changed in order to keep the young officers away from politics. The new 
education system mostly emphasized the loyalty to the superiors in the military hierarchy. 
The senior commanders made frequent visits to the war academies in order to test the 
waters and the tendencies of the new generation. Probably, 1980 military intervention, 
which was led by the senior officers and obeyed by the junior officers, proved the success 
of the new measurements that focused on loyalty to the superiors.  
Implications 
 The military elite insisted on a non-partisan image, to prevent a 
polarization within the military.  
 Moreover, they changed the curriculums of the military schools to 
indoctrinate the loyalty to the superiors and the merit of hierarchy.  
 In order to prevent the possible attempts of young officers, the 
senior officers resorted to intervening into politics by warnings and 
daily comments. This development created another tradition of 
intervention, which would last until recently. 
2. Democratic incentives 
The Involvement of the Civilians 
 1960 military intervention was far civilian in terms of cooperation 
and intercourse, comparing to the 1980 military regime. This attempt is an indicator that 
the officers did not have a coherent intention of an autocracy, or a political system 
different from democracy.  
The purge of National Unity Committee (NUC) in 1960 
 The purge in the NUC in 1960 was an indicator that the radicals 
who were demanding drastic changes in the political system of the country were no more 
effective. Conversely, the new NUC was comprised of the members who were favoring a 
parliamentarian system.   
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Western Incentives 
It was understood that, one of the reasons of the soft character of 
the 1971 military intervention was the Western consideration. According to the 
traditional Westernization process of the Turkey, it would be a controversy if they oust 
the political institution by an actual military coup, which was not favored at that time by 
the Western ideology.  
Implications 
 The involvement of the civilians had an effect for accelerating the 
process of transition, since the professors prepared a constitution, 
which was more liberal and social than the previous one.  
 The operation within the NUC, in which the democratic group won 
the rivalry over the autocratic fraction, was the victory of the 
democracy over a possible military autocracy.  
 The modernization and Westernization process of the country, 
which goes back to 18th century, was mostly led by the military 
elite. Therefore, in every attempt, as the case of 1971 intervention, 
the military considered the Western countries’ reactions. It became 
a factor before and after the intervention. The “before” effect of the 
West was to soften the level of the intervention; while the “after” 
effect of the West was to urge the military elite for a transition into 
democracy.    
3. Institutional developments 
New Institutions and Their Effects 
Since the military coup was initiated by the junior officers, it was 
both a revolution in the army and a direct control of the state institutions by the 
inexperienced cadre. Therefore, the military elite who carried out the intervention had to 
search for a senior support. The establishment of the National Unity Committee (NUC) 
was a result of that senior support. The retired commander of the Land Forces, accepted 
to be the leader of the committee, which legitimized the young revolutionaries in the 
perspective of the senior officers.   
On the other hand, the establishment of another institution, the 
National Security Council (NSC) radically changed the civil military relations of the 
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country henceforth. With the outweighing military members, the NSC has always been in 
the politics, until the recent changes in the structure.  
Institutional Tremors 
They called for the help of the academicians in order to change the 
constitution with a more liberal and social one, which would grant freedom to the people. 
The involvement of the senior support legitimized the coup; however, it also politicized 
it. Eventually, the new and strong institution of the coup, National Unity Committee had 
to confront with the strong remnants of the Democrat Party, against which they 
intervened. 
A Soft Balance Between the Academics and the Military 
The radical orders of the NUC, regarding the arrest of the 
politicians, retired generals, and dismissal of nearly 150 university rectors, created a 
discomfort among many segments of the community. However, the most reactive one 
was the academic cadre, which openly protested by the resignation of all of the rectors 
from the universities. At the end the academic cadre was restored to their previous posts. 
The involvement of the professors also should have had an effect on the moderation of 
the conflict.    
A Stunning Return to Politics 
The restriction on political activity was lifted on January 1961, and 
eleven new parties were registered. The most important one was the Justice Party, which 
was led by a retired general, and which played a role close to the DP. The new 
constitution was more liberal than the previous one, in the sense that it tolerated a wider 
spectrum of political activity than before, both to the left and to the right. The new 
constitution set forth that there should be a referendum. It was held on July 1961, nearly 
one year after the military intervention that the referendum took place. The results were 
stunning. There was nearly 40 percent counter vote, despite the strong propaganda in 
favor of the new constitution! This was a setback for the military elite. The second shock 
was the result of the parliamentary elections on October 1961. Because the new parties 
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that would be accepted as the continuation or heir of the Democrat Party, had the 
strongest political support in the country.110     
1971”Soft” Intervention and the Constitutional Changes 
The 1971 military intervention was a softer and milder one 
comparing to the previous military coup. It was mostly because of the institutional 
developments that gave a chance to the military to intervene into politics with a legal and 
legitimized organization, National Security Council. The military had to be contended 
with a warning to the government and demanding amendments for the constitution. It was 
also a result of the institutional inability of the government which was a product of the 
1961 constitution.   
Implications 
 The establishment of the National Unity Committee helped to the 
legitimization of the military coup, since it was the product of a 
senior support from the top brass. It also institutionalized the 
existence of the military within politics. 
 The 1961 Constitution and the establishment of the National 
Security Council was a further step of institutionalizing the 
existence of the military. Its overweighing military nature has been 
a decisive factor in politics until recent changes. 
 The reconciliation with the academic cadre had an effect in 
institutional acceptance of the military junta. 
 The referendum for the new constitution proved that, despite the 
propaganda, nearly half of the population was against the new 
regulation and basically the military intervention.  
 The regulations of 1961 Constitution weakened the institutional 
authority of the government to prevent the hegemony of a single 
party supported by the majority. However, the new system 
rendered the governments unable to govern effectively, which 
brought about the economic and political crisis of 1960s. This 
process ended with the second but milder intervention of 1971, 
which was basically a list of demands for some constitutional 
amendments.      
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VI. CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS AFTER THE LAST COUP 
(1980–2013) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This period, includes the rule of the military regime in between 1980 and 1983 
and the afterwards. The rise of civilian authority was mostly due to a civilian politician, 
who was not banned from politics and who acted as a counselor through the military 
regime. Turgut Ozal, enjoying having no political background, formed a new party and 
garnered the majority of 1983 elections, after which he became the Prime Minister. 
Although the military elite openly supported another party, they respected the elected 
government because of the clean background of Turgut Ozal. 
The main transition of civil military relations began in Ozal’s tenure. Since he 
applied a liberal economy system which helped a lot to erect the economy, the reforms 
and the civilian priority was welcomed by the military. It was also affective that he was a 
deputy Prime Minister of the military government, which made him familiar with the 
military elite, so that he could intervene into the military issues. 
The term that the military lost power ended with the sudden death of Ozal in 
1993. The revival of the military effects in the politics was in between 1993 and 2002. In 
1997, the military intervened into politics with a soft coup, after which the Prime Minister 
of the time resigned and a new government was formed.  
After the economic crisis of 2001, Turkish people made their choice, in the 
elections of 2002, on a new party which was promising justice and development with a 
fresh cadre. The Chief of the General Staff was also replaced with General Hilmi Ozkok, 
who had an understanding of progressive civil military relations, different from his 
predecessor who was accepted to have conservative paradigm about civil military 
relations.  
The co-existence of Ozkok and the new party, which was accepted as successful 
in terms of economic developments, helped the implementation of important changes in 
civil military relations.       
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1. The Rapid Shift of Governmental Powers from Military to Civilians 
The military regime which lasted three years (1980–83) was ended with the rapid 
shift of governmental authority from military elite to the civilians after the elections of 
1983. The motives behind this fast shift of power were mainly the democratic values 
encouraged by the Western powers and economic considerations, while an isolation of 
the military elite from politics was a supportive factor to the process. 
2. The Gradual Shift of Political Power in terms of the Balance in Civil 
Military Relations   
The governmental shift of power had also triggered a broader and more general 
shift of power, which began with the strong government of Turgut Ozal. The military 
dominance decreased in the late 1980s. The sudden death of Turgut Ozal in 1993 affected 
the balance adversely, ending with the soft intervention of 1997, after which the Prime 
Minister resigned. The democratic values, which were embodied in the membership 
process to the European Union, were the decisive factors for another decrease in the 
military dominance in the late 1990s. The new government after the 2002 elections, and 
its coexistence with the new Chief of the General Staff, Hilmi Ozkok, who supported the 
democratic values in terms of efforts towards membership, accelerated the general shift 
of balance to the detriment of the military. The process culminated with the engagement 
of the high ranking generals in lawsuits, regarding alleged coups against the incumbent 
government.    
B. ISOLATION OF THE OFFICER CORPS FROM POLITICS 
1. Do what I said, Don’t do what I did! 
The architecture of the 1980 military coup, General Kenan Evren, just eighteen 
days after the coup, made a speech to the cadets at the War Academy delivering those 
words: 
Whenever the army entered into politics it began to lose its discipline and, 
gradually it was led into corruption. We can observe its most basic example in our 
recent history, during the Balkan War. Therefore, I demand from you once again 
not to take our present operation as an example to yourselves and never to get 
involved in politics. We had to implement this operation within a chain of 
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commands and orders to save the army from politics and to cleanse it from 
political dirt.111 
These were intimate feeling of a General who was considering the isolation of the 
officer corps from politics as a crucial factor for the unity of the army.  
2. Timetable for Transition to Democracy 
At the end of 1981, National Security Council (NSC), prepared a timetable of 
transition to democracy. This was believed to some extent to assure the Europeans about 
the Generals’ genuine intention to establish parliamentary democracy and to ease the 
pressures. Additionally, it was thought that in order to rebuild Turkey’s image in the 
West, such a public commitment would be helpful.112  
3. Several other Motives 
First of all, the military elite who were well aware of the fact that it was not 
feasible to set up a permanent military regime, allowed the transition into democracy. 
They left the work of the civilians to the civilians. Moreover, they saw themselves as the 
‘guardian’ of the regime, not the ‘ruler’ of it. Thirdly, the Turkish experience of 
democracy, and military interventions taught that a military regime could not have a 
popular support in the long term in this country. Lastly, Turkey’s political, economical, 
institutional and ideological engagement in the Western world, and the present danger of 
losing the gains and accumulations of the last centuries since the reformist movements 
commenced, created a long-term thought that affected the Generals to decide a transition 
into democracy.113    
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C. DEMOCRATIC INCENTIVES 
1. Pressure from the European Community and Parliament  
European Community initially reacted in a mild manner, since they did not want 
to alienate the new regime immediately after the coup from the sphere of the Europe. 
Even, the first reaction can be called as reluctance since the embassies of the member 
states dispatched reports that were very welcoming and positive. The increasing tone of 
criticism from the community was probably due to the internal developments in Turkey. 
However, there were several other reasons of the increasing criticism. Firstly, they 
realized that they could affect the course of event in Turkey by economic and political 
pressure with the aid package at hand. Secondly, the lobby activities of the politicians 
fled from Turkey necessitated the pressure the Generals for a fast shift to democracy in 
Turkey. Thirdly, the community was under the pressure of European public opinion 
against the Generals.114 
2. U.S. Encouragement for Transition to Democracy 
As the main military supplier of Turkey, the USA and its reaction was important 
for the Generals. As soon as the military coup took place, U.S. officials declared that 
there will be no sanctions about U.S. aid to Turkey. U.S. expressed its trust in Turkish 
military and their promise to restore democracy. Moreover, U.S. officials blamed 
European counterparts for failing to understand Turkey’s problems and effectively 
lobbied in favor of Turkey for a possible expulsion from Council of Europe. In return, the 
Generals agreed to the return of Greece to the military wing of NATO, and to ratify the 
Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement. From the American perspective; 
It believed that quiet encouragement of the Generals to restore democracy and 
respect for human rights would be much more effective (and less harmful to 
American interests) than cutting the aid or resorting to public diplomacy.115    
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3. German Pressure for Transition to Democracy 
(West) Germany had always been the second biggest supplier of military and 
economic assistance to Turkey. Therefore, the relations between Turkey and Germany 
became important for the military elite. Besides, just after the coup, numerous politicians 
from Turkey fled to Germany for political asylum. Turkey’s demand about their return 
was refused since they were accepted by Germany as the ‘political refugees’. This 
problem got bigger by the activities of those refugees through European countries against 
the military regime in Turkey. They also became a source of information and sometimes 
misinformation or exaggeration about human right violations and torture allegations. 
Ultimately they were quite successful in terms of shaping the European public opinion 
about the new regime. As a result West Germany blocked the delivery of an aid package 
under the 1981 OECD aid consortium. Moreover, the German government also refused a 
Turkish request to coordinate another loan package. Since the process of a return to 
democracy had no progress at the time, the Germans were under continuous pressure 
from different parliamentarians, political parties, and pressure groups to reduce its aid to 
Turkey.116     
4. Pressure from the other European Countries 
Britain followed a mild policy and a quiet diplomacy, in order to persuade the 
Generals to moderate their handling of the issues within the country or in its relations 
with Western Europe. They were also concerned about democracy and human rights 
issues. France’s reaction was mainly an inter-state complaint to the Human Rights 
Commission against Turkey. Scandinavian countries stood firm from the beginning. They 
strongly condemned the coup when it took place and immediately took the issue to the 
European organizations. In short, democracy and human rights issues were highly 
publicized in the Western Europe. At the beginning the European countries performed a 
rather mild reaction; however, as the time passed, without much progress, they became 
tougher.117   
                                                 
116 Ibid., 126. 
117 Ibid., 127. 
 74
5. Criteria for Membership to the European Union 
Membership to the European Union was the last target of the Turkish 
Westernization process going back to the 18th century. Turkey, applied to the 
organization for membership in 1960s; however, the volatile relations with the West, the 
fluctuating domestic politics, and the hesitation of the leading European countries like 
Germany or France made it an excruciating process.  
Copenhagen Criteria were the membership criteria for the EU, which were laid 
down at the 1993 European Council in Copenhagen, Denmark. The criteria necessitated 
for the candidate states, the stability of the institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights, respect for and protection of the minorities, and the existence of a 
functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with the competitive pressure 
and market forces within the Union. Although there was no mechanism for ensuring that 
any country which was already a member state was in compliance with the criteria, 
Turkish politicians devoted themselves to meet the criteria, which were debated and 
accused of being biased against Turkey’s membership. By time, since the Copenhagen 
Criteria were the elements to carry out the Westernization and the modernization, 
military had also embraced the attempts towards meeting the criteria. For example 
General Özkök openly supported the EU membership and the reforms, and emphasized 
his appreciation for the modernization in 2003.118                
6. New Curriculums, Favoring Democracy, for the Military Schools 
The change of the attitudes of the generals had affected the civil military relations 
both in terms of political-military interactions in strategic level and in terms of changing 
worldview of the officer corps. General Hilmi Özkök, who was the Chief of the General 
Staff between 2002 and 2006, performed a different (or democratic) approach towards 
civil military relations. His interpretation of the role of the Turkish Military was quite 
clear and democratic: 
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The duties and functions of the military (in Turkey, too) have been designed by 
law and the Turkias Armed Forces are expected to conform to that legislation. 
Since those laws were enacted by the representatives of the people, the situation 
in Turkey does not deviate from the universally valid principle of ‘civilian control 
of the military.’ What differentiates Turkish case from others is the special 
relationship between the people and the military.119 
Özkök, also planned to implement new curriculums in the military schools, which 
would favor democratic values and respect for the judgment of Turkish Nation, in order 
to bring up a new generation of officers who are imbued with democratic principles.120  
7. Democratic Transformation of Civil-military Relations 
The Conflict of “Guardianship” and “Modernization” 
The military’s roles of modernization of the country and the 
guardianship of the regime were not conflicting since the military was performing its 
guardian role in cases of political disorder and incapability that blocked the 
modernization process. As in the cases of Adnan Menderes and Turgut Özal, military 
obeyed and complied with the strong political institutions, since they were strongly 
supporting modernization processes (1960 intervention was an exception since the 
government was overusing its political power against the oppositionist movements and 
leading to political disorder). 
When the governments openly supported the Western and secular 
values and acted in accordance, the military would comply with the government. A 
military intervention into politics of such a government, and to guard the regime from a 
modernizing institution, would be discrepancy. This was the key element of the 
explanation of the silent demilitarization of Turkish Politics in the last decade, which was 
accepted as the transformation of the civil-military relations of Turkey. 
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Gradual Changes Beginning: 1997–2002 
Just after the recession of the Islamist party in 1997, the military 
returned to barracks. With the effects of the ongoing European Union membership 
process, important changes took place:  
 In June 1999, the military judges were removed from the state security 
courts.  
 In October 2001, the civilian membership increased in the National 
Security Council with an amendment to the constitution.  
 That the government should give ‘priority consideration’ to the decisions 
of the NSC, was replaced a ‘notification.’121    
Gradual Change in Progress: 2002–2005  
After the elections of 2002, the announcement of the government 
about the strict loyalty to the modernization and secular values, and the coexistence of the 
Chief of the General Staff Hilmi Özkök, who was also loyal to the democratic values and 
the professional role of the military as in Western democracies, accelerated the 
transformation of the military’s role in Turkish politics. 
 In July 2003, the requirement that the secretary general of the NSC be a 
serving member of the military was abolished.  
 The secretary general’s unlimited access to any agency and the authority 
to inspect the implementation of the NSC decisions.  
 The proportion of the civilian employees increased.  
 The frequency of the meetings was reduced from once every month to 
once every two month.122    
In 2002, 70 percent of the Turkish population was supporting the 
membership to the European Union. The reforms implemented eagerly and there was a 
hope for a full membership in the public opinion. However, by 2005, it was supposed that 
there was going to be no full membership. The discourse with the EU had affected the 
civil military relations, since the main reason of the reforms was to implement the EU 
reforms.     
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D. ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
1. Military Realized the Role of the Economy 
Despite many politicians were jailed or banned from politics for a while, one of 
the civilian bureaucrats, Turgut Özal, stayed in the power. He served for the military 
government as a counselor for economic issues, after the 1980 coup. However, he 
resigned from this post and formed his own party, and garnered the biggest slice of the 
votes of 1983 election, after which he became the prime minister. He was not favored by 
the military, neither was he supported by them when resigning from his post. However, 
his international personal connections, and vest economy knowledge and experience, 
rendered him an indispensable factor for economic development. That was why the 
military, had to work with him, which proves that the military was highly cognizant of 
the importance of the economy after the military coup.123This cognizance finally 
accelerated the transition process of the authority back to the civilians.    
2. The Motivation of a Strong Governance 
One of the main targets of the military elite was to create a stronger country, in 
terms of governmental institutions. It was understood by the constitutional amendments 
they applied. The authority of the prime minister and the president was empowered. 
Although there was a supervisor role of the generals, it was in case of an inability in the 
governance. This may be interpreted that, there would be no intervention as long as there 
was a strong government in terms of institutional entity, or the new civilian actors and 
their political performance would decide a possible military intervention.124      
3. Positive Approach of the Military Towards the Elected Government 
The Generals, after the 38-months-long military regime, had supported one of the 
political parties which had cleavages to themselves, before the 1983 elections. However, 
another party, which was publicly criticized days before the elections by the generals, 
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garnered 45 percent of the votes. More interesting was that, the generals welcomed the 
new party. As McFadden asserted; 
From the beginning, no one in the higher echelons of the military has evinced 
anything other than a strong desire to restore to Turkey a functioning democratic 
government. In short, while the military may have left itself in a position to 
intervene, only a return of the violent politics of the 1970s is likely to encourage 
them to do so.125    
 
E. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE INTERVENTIONS 
1. 1997 Intervention 
The National Security Council (NSC) presented prime minister, who was heading 
a pro-Islamic party, with a list of 20 directives, in 1 March 1997. There was two choices 
for the prime minister: Cracking down the Muslim revivalism, or providing the grounds 
for a military coup.126 This process ended with the resignation of the pro-Islamic prime 
minister.  
2. Underlying Causes of 1997 Intervention 
Weakening of the Military Dominance: 1983–1993 
As soon as the civilian government took the scene, after the 1983 
elections, the new Prime Minister, Turgut Özal, gradually weakened both the institutional 
dominance and the psychological priority of the military in the daily politics. Firstly, he 
gradually changed the military representatives in the civilian institutions with civilian 
counterparts. One step further, he intervened into the appointment of the Chief of the 
General Staff, and appointed a candidate different from the one that the supreme 
command proposed, in 1987. He came up with the idea of military budget and defense 
funds, and broke the taboos related with the supremacy of the military among the 
bureaucrats. Moreover, his cabinet officially declared that the Chief of the General Staff 
should report to the defense minister, as the case in every Western democratic country. 
He cancelled a military training exercise due to political coordination with a neighboring 
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state, in which he emphasized the superiority of the political institutions over the military 
ones.127 
When he became the President in 1989, he became an undisputable 
personal who exerted the political superiority over the military more decisively. The 
President’s new foreign policy, regarding the developments of the Persian Gulf crisis, 
created a strife between the supreme command and the president. Interestingly, the 
reaction of the military was quite mild. The Chief of the General Staff resigned in 1990, 
which was an extraordinary development for the civil military relations. However, the 
civilian authority could not establish an absolute superiority over the military.128 It is 
beyond question that this weakening process had created a grievance among the military 
elite, who yearned for the military atmosphere of the early 1980s. Probably this process 
had an effect on the ‘soft coup’ of 1997.      
Return of the Military Dominance: 1993–2002 
With the sudden death of the President Turgut Ozal had 
contributed to an increase in the political power of the military institution. Moreover, the 
change in the political life from strong governance to weak coalitions after 1991, and the 
continuous involvement of the military in the campaigns against PKK (Terrorist 
Organization in the South-Eastern Region of Turkey), kept the internal autonomy of the 
military intact. Being the direct responsible institution for curing the PKK problem, the 
military reinforced its position in politics as the spokesman of the internal threats (by 
means of taking decisions in the National Security Council). Moreover, the politicians 
began to rely on supporting military in order to stay in the power.129  
Revival of the Islam in the Politics 
In July 1996, a pro-Islamist party came to the power within a 
coalition. The new religious Prime Minister initiated some policies, which were 
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interpreted by the military as dangerous steps for the secular structure of the country. 
Most famous of these, was his attempt to strengthen the ties with Muslim countries, 
which were listed as the sponsors of the terrorism by the Western countries, most 
importantly by the USA. Moreover, his plan to build large mosques on sites that were 
integrated with the secularism and his attempts about lifting the ban on wearing 
headscarves for the civil servants on duty, created a conflict between the military and the 
government. The religious fundamentalism became the first among the internal threats. 
Finally, the rhetoric of a future implementation of the Shariah (Islamic Rule), by the 
officials of the party, was the last straw.130      
3. 2007 e-Ultimatum 
On April 27 2007, the Chief of the General Staff General Yaşar BÜYÜKANIT 
publicized an electronic ultimatum warning the politicians about the secular structure of 
the Turkish state. However, it was promptly and strongly refuted by the government, 
reminding that the Chief of the General Staff is responsible to the Prime Minister 
according to the constitution.131     
4. Underlying Causes of 2007 e-Ultimatum 
Guarding the Secularism 
In 2002, a Muslim democrat party, JDP (AKP) Justice (Adalet) and 
Development (Kalkınma) Party (Partisi), won the elections. The new government was 
relatively more stable and its political leadership was stronger. The coexistence of the 
new government with the new Chief of the General Staff Hilmi Özkök (2002–2006), who 
was known to be a progressive personality and who had a definite support for 
membership to European Union and appreciation for the implementation of necessary 
reforms, helped the civilian elite to experience working in coordination with the military. 
However, the religious tendencies of the new administration drew attention in the 
conservative side of the military. Especially, through the presidential elections of 2007, 
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the pro-Islamist candidate of the JDP, radical religious demonstrations and low level 
official manifestations of radical Islamism intensified the anxiety of the military.132  
F. ASSESSMENT OF THE VARIABLES 
1. Isolation of the officer corps from politics 
 The generals, who were coherently organized and carried the coup out, were 
cognizant of a possible junior coup attempt. That was why the Chief of the General Staff 
made a visit to war academy and gave speech about the importance of staying away from 
politics. 
The manifestation of a timetable for transition to democracy was another 
indication of a general isolation from politics. The previous military intervention 
experiences proved that there is no welcome for a military regime in that country.  
The relations with the Western world, which had become a part of the 
modernization process of Turkey, also affected the attitude of the Generals towards 
isolation. 
Implications 
 One of the first actions of the generals after the military coup, was 
to caution the young officers about isolation from politics. 
 The timetable for transition to democracy was also a timetable for 
the institutional isolation from the politics. 
 Considering the West had also affected the generals to focus on a 
isolation from politics. 
2. Democratic incentives 
International Reactions 
The reaction of U.S. which was initially supportive, based on the 
geostrategic importance of Turkey’s stability; it was also encouraging a transition into 
democracy. However, it was obvious that stability of Turkey was more important than 
democracy in Turkey for the USA. 
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The reactions of the European Countries ranging from Scandinavia 
to the Iberia, and European Parliament were important for the Generals. Their initial 
reaction was reluctant (with exceptions of Scandinavian countries which reacted harshly 
from the very beginning); however, after a year of military regime, they began to strictly 
criticize the Generals for a transition into democracy.  
As the informal representative of the European countries and the 
most familiar country with Turkey, Germany had a pressure on itself for creating a 
pressure on the Generals. The pressure was aiming at a fast transition to democracy. 
1990s: The Conflict of “Guardianship” and “Modernization” 
These two roles had never conflicted before. When guardianship 
was necessary, there was a threat to modernization. However, with the 1990s, the re-
emergence of EU membership process and the embracement of the reforms by the 
civilian government, the two roles began to conflict, which ended with the victory of the 
modernization of the country by means of politicians.  
Membership Process to the European Union 
EU membership was a means of modernization. Therefore, the 
military, as the traditional instrument of the modernization, supported the process, even if 
the process would damage the military’s political authority. In that point, the General 
Hilmi Özkök played the most crucial role. He democratically coordinated with the 
government. Moreover, whenever the Prime Minister and the Chief of the general Staff 
appeared in public together, Özkök and the Prime Minister appeared to have established a 
relaxed even harmonious relationship.133 This coordination helped the implementation of 
the reforms even to the detriment of the military’s traditional political authority.  
The new curriculums in the military schools were also the 
indicators of democratization of the officer corps. The educational change also indicated 
that the military elite, led by Özkök, had seen the importance of the democratic values for 
modernization.     
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Implications 
 Despite the fact that each government and organization reacted 
different, the international reactions had a role in transition to 
democracy. 
 Membership to the EU, had a great effect on pacifying the relations 
between civilian and military authorities while taking drastic steps 
in terms of democratic civil military relations. 
 The judicial, structural, and institutional changes, which were 
silently activated, had dramatic effects.  
 The progressive paradigm of the military elite, led by General 
Hilmi Özkök, also had an unparalleled effect on reforms in civil 
military relations.  
3. Economic and institutional developments 
Military Realized the Role of the Economy 
Economy was one of the factors that affected the cooperation with 
economy technocrats, which eventually accelerated the transition process from military to 
the civilians. Turgut Özal, who was the economist technocrat of the time, had the chance 
to govern the country for a decade, in which he also took measures against the priority of 
the military in the political realm. 
The Motivation of a Strong Governance 
From 1980 on, it was interpreted that, there would be no 
intervention as long as there was a strong government in terms of institutional entity. The 
pacific reaction of the military to the reforms that were against itself, proved that the 
strong civilian governance, is a strong element of democratic civil military relations.    
Positive Approach of the Military towards the Elected 
Government 
The Generals embraced the government of Turgut Özal, which 
garnered the majority of the votes. It was a product of the respect for the people and their 
choice. A similar case was in 2002, when the military embraced the JDP government. 
These are the indicators of a positive approach to the democracy by the military elite. 
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Implications 
 Comprehension of the importance of the role of economy 
accelerated the transition process after the 1980 intervention. 
 Institutionally strong governments had the chance to cooperate and 
even subordinate the military. 
 The institutional positive approach of the military elite towards the 
elected governments, proved that the military do not want to deal 
with politics anymore, in term of interventions. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
A. TRADITIONAL FEATURES OF TURKISH ARMY 
The relation between Turkish Army and the State, and its evolution in the 
traditional perspective, can be summarized as; 
 The unification of the state and the army under the personality of the 
Sultan, 
 The unique loyalty of the military to the Sultan but to no other entity, 
 The privilege: the tradition of military men becoming state men,   
 The army as an element of disorder in the Empire,   
 The dire need for reforms and the resistance from the army, 
 Transformation of the resistance and reactions into military intervention,  
 The modernization of the army and the new education system on liberal 
thought, 
 The army as a force, demanding a constitutional change in the regime, 
Regarding the fact that the founders of the new Turkish republic were the officers 
of the Ottoman Army and were imbued with the reformist thoughts of the 19th century, it 
can be understood that the foundation of the new Turkish Republic and its new army 
were naturally affected by the evolution of this military-state interaction. 
B. ISOLATION FROM POLITICS 
Turkish Military is a continuum of an experienced army of hundreds of years. 
Throughout the history, military and state have always united in one personality. The 
founder of the Ottoman Empire, Osman Gazi was a statesman and the army commander, 
as his grandchild Fatih the conqueror, Sultan Yavuz, or Magnificent Süleyman were. 
Mustafa Kemal was also an officer and general of the Ottoman army, who unified the 
military and the civilian personalities in himself. However, he managed to isolate the 
military from civilian authority during his tenure of 15 years. 
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1. Isolation in Turkish Army between 1918 and 1960 
In the initial phase of the independence movement, Mustafa Kemal had to resign 
from his military post. By resigning in order to serve for his country in terms of a civilian 
struggle, he also embraced and showed the difference between the soldier and the 
statesman. As he ascended the stairs of his political career he emphasized the necessity 
for isolation of the military from politics. From his time on, this isolation became one of 
the main traditions of the officer corps and affected the civil military relations of Turkey 
in a positive way.     
Although in the first decades, there seems to be an absorbing of the military into 
politics, it was because of Mustafa Kemal’s strategy of keeping the military under 
control. With the help of a loyal general, Marshal Fevzi Cakmak, the military never 
confronted with the politics in the first two decades of the Republic. By the way, Mustafa 
Kemal gradually isolated the military from the politics, by legislative measurements. 
2. Isolation in Turkish Army after 1960 Intervention 
After the 1960 intervention, the military elite realized that they had to behave 
above politics, in order to preserve the unity of the army. An ironical result of the 
isolation process after the 1960 coup was that, the generals had to intervene into politics 
to prevent the junior officers from dealing with politics. They were aware of the fact that, 
the intervention damaged the hierarchical structure of the army. Therefore, they changed 
the curriculum of the military schools in order to give an education based on merit of the 
loyalty to the superiors. Those factors highly supported the isolation tradition, which 
would show its effects decades later. 
3. Isolation in Turkish Army after 1980 Intervention   
The generals, who were coherently organized and carried the coup out, were 
cognizant of a possible junior coup attempt. That was why the Chief of the General Staff 
made a visit to war academy and gave speech about the importance of staying away from 
politics. 
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The manifestation of a timetable for transition to democracy was another 
indication of a general isolation from politics. The previous military intervention 
experiences proved that there is no welcome for a military regime in that country.  
The relations with the Western world, which had become a part of the 
modernization process of Turkey, also affected the attitude of the Generals towards 
isolation. 
C. DEMOCRATIC INCENTIVES 
Democracy, as a part of the modernization has always been respected by the 
military. According to the military elite, the problem was the inability of the civilian 
politicians who caused political and economic disorder in the country.  
1. Democratic Incentives through 1918–1960   
One-party Era 
As a summary, despite the democratic incentives, Turkey was 
ruled under a one-party rule for almost three decades, which cannot be accepted as 
democracy. In the meantime, there were two attempts for a multi-party system (1925–
30), and the reforms showed their effects by creating a social change on the new 
generation that ultimately accelerated the transition to democracy. The actual transition 
took place in between 1945–1950.134 
Social Reforms as Investments to Future Democracy 
The most important democratic incentive of that period was the 
reforms and the change in the social structure which affected the next decades of the 
country in terms of transition to democracy. 
The social structure had dramatically changed in that era. It was 
due to the social reforms that aimed at making Turkey a member of the contemporary 
civilizations. The change of alphabet from Arabic to Latin script, electoral reforms in 
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favor of females and many other reforms had been highly effective in imbuing the youth 
with motives of modern life.  
Positioning in the West 
Turkey’s relations with Western world accelerated in that era. 
Turkey became a member of the United Nations, European Council, NATO and some 
regional organizations which were supported by the West in terms of bipolar struggle 
between the West and the East. Especially the membership to the NATO and becoming a 
close ally to USA had a dramatic change in the military system, and the officer corps. 
The new techniques and tactics of the new warfare and the different institutional 
traditions affected the young officers in Turkish army. It was also a social change within 
the army, which led to the 1960 military coup. Thus, the social change in the officer 
corps had a drastic effect in civil military relations in Turkey.   
2. Democratic Incentives through 1960–1980   
The Involvement of the Civilians 
 1960 military intervention was far civilian in terms of cooperation and 
intercourse, comparing to the 1980 military regime. This attempt is an indicator that the 
officers did not have a coherent intention of an autocracy, or a political system different 
from democracy.  
The purge of National Unity Community (NUC) in 1960 
The purge in the NUC in 1960 was an indicator that the radicals 
who were demanding drastic changes in the political system of the country were no more 
effective. Conversely, the new NUC was comprised of the members who were favoring a 
parliamentarian system.   
Western Incentives 
It was understood that, one of the reasons of the soft character of 
the 1971 military intervention was the Western consideration. According to the 
traditional Westernization process of the Turkey, it would be a controversy if they oust 
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the political institution by an actual military coup, which was not favored at that time by 
the Western ideology.  
3. Democratic Incentives after 1980 Intervention   
International Reactions 
The reaction of U.S. which was initially supportive, based on the 
geostrategic importance of Turkey’s stability; it was also encouraging a transition into 
democracy. However, it was obvious that stability of Turkey was more important than 
democracy in Turkey for the USA. 
The reactions of the European Countries ranging from Scandinavia 
to the Iberia, and European Parliament were important for the Generals. Their initial 
reaction was reluctant (with exceptions of Scandinavian countries which reacted harshly 
from the very beginning); however, after a year of military regime, they began to strictly 
criticize the Generals for a transition into democracy.  
As the informal representative of the European countries and the 
most familiar country with Turkey, Germany had a pressure on itself for creating a 
pressure on the Generals. The pressure was aiming at a fast transition to democracy. 
Membership Process to the European Union 
EU membership was a means of modernization. Therefore, the 
military, as the traditional instrument of the modernization, supported the process, even if 
the process would damage the military’s political authority. In that point, the General 
Hilmi Özkök played the most crucial role. He democratically coordinated with the 
government. Moreover, whenever the Prime Minister and the Chief of the general Staff 
appeared in public together, Özkök and the Prime Minister appeared to have established a 
relaxed even harmonious relationship.135 This coordination helped the implementation of 
the reforms even to the detriment of the military’s traditional political authority.  
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The new curriculums in the military schools were also the 
indicators of democratization of the officer corps. The educational change also indicated 
that the military elite, led by Özkök, had seen the importance of the democratic values for 
modernization.     
1990s: The Conflict of “Guardianship” and “Modernization” 
These two roles had never conflicted before. When guardianship 
was necessary, there was a threat to modernization. However, with the 1990s, the re-
emergence of EU membership process and the embracement of the reforms by the 
civilian government, the two roles began to conflict, which ended with the victory of the 
modernization of the country by means of politicians.  
D. INSTITUTIONAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 
1. Institutional and Economic Developments between 1918 and 1960 
Institutional Responsibility of the Military 
 The foundation of the new republic was led by the officers and the 
leading politicians of the first two decades were mostly originated from military. 
Moreover, there was an organic and direct relation between military elite and the 
governing elite. Naturally, the mission of the military was clearly defined as the guardian 
of the modernization and progress. This was clearly stated by Mustafa Kemal in a public 
speech in Konya. Military was also effective in economic decisions, since the new 
projects like railroad constructions or new factories were consulted to the military before 
activation. After the death of Mustafa Kemal in 1938 and the retirement (after a two-
decade-long tenure) of the first Chief of the General Staff in 1944, the balance between 
civilians and military began to change in favor of the civilians.   
Important Changes for Subordination of the Military 
 In 1944, just after the retirement of the first Chief of the General 
Staff Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, the government manifested its discomfort about the present 
civil military relations by subordinating the military under the prime minister. This was a 
drastic change in terms of the institutional role of the military. Five year later, in 1949, 
 91
civilians took one step more against the military and the military was put under the 
minister of defense. These two institutional changes were landmarks of the civil military 
relations background of Turkey.  
2. Institutional and Economic Developments between 1960 and 1980 
New Institutions and Their Effects 
 Since the military coup was initiated by the junior officers, it was 
both a revolution in the army and a direct control of the state institutions by the 
inexperienced cadre. Therefore, the military elite who carried out the intervention had to 
search for a senior support. The establishment of the National Unity Committee (NUC) 
was a result of that senior support. The retired commander of the Land Forces, accepted 
to be the leader of the committee, which legitimized the young revolutionaries in the 
perspective of the senior officers.   
 On the other hand, the establishment of another institution, the 
National Security Council (NSC) radically changed the civil military relations of the 
country henceforth. With the outweighing military members, the NSC has always been in 
the politics, until the recent changes in the structure.  
Institutional Tremors 
 They called for the help of the academicians in order to change the 
constitution with a more liberal and social one, which would grant freedom to the people. 
The involvement of the senior support legitimized the coup; however, it also politicized 
it. Eventually, the new and strong institution of the coup, National Unity Committee had 
to confront with the strong remnants of the Democrat Party, against which they 
intervened. 
A Soft Balance Between the Academics and the Military 
 The radical orders of the NUC, regarding the arrest of the 
politicians, retired generals, and dismissal of nearly 150 university rectors, created a 
discomfort among many segments of the community. However, the most reactive one 
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was the academic cadre, which openly protested by the resignation of all of the rectors 
from the universities. At the end the academic cadre was restored to their previous posts. 
The involvement of the professors also should have had an effect on the moderation of 
the conflict.    
A Stunning Return to Politics 
  The restriction on political activity was lifted on January 1961, and 
eleven new parties were registered. The most important one was the Justice Party, which 
was led by a retired general, and which played a role close to the DP. The new 
constitution was more liberal than the previous one, in the sense that it tolerated a wider 
spectrum of political activity than before, both to the left and to the right. The new 
constitution set forth that there should be a referendum. It was held on July 1961, nearly 
one year after the military intervention that the referendum took place. The results were 
stunning. There was nearly 40 percent counter vote, despite the strong propaganda in 
favor of the new constitution! This was a setback for the military elite. The second shock 
was the result of the parliamentary elections on October 1961. Because the new parties 
that would be accepted as the continuation or heir of the Democrat Party, had the 
strongest political support in the country.136     
1971”Soft” Intervention and the Constitutional Changes 
The 1971 military intervention was a softer and milder one 
comparing to the previous military coup. It was mostly because of the institutional 
developments that gave a chance to the military to intervene into politics with a legal and 
legitimized organization, National Security Council. The military had to be contended 
with a warning to the government and demanding amendments for the constitution. It was 
also a result of the institutional inability of the government which was a product of the 
1961 constitution.   
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3. Institutional and Economic Developments after 1980 Intervention 
Military Realized the Role of the Economy 
 Economy was one of the factors that affected the cooperation with 
economy technocrats, which eventually accelerated the transition process from military to 
the civilians. Turgut Özal, who was the economist technocrat of the time, had the chance 
to govern the country for a decade, in which he also took measures against the priority of 
the military in the political realm. 
The Motivation of a Strong Governance 
 From 1980 on, it was interpreted that, there would be no 
intervention as long as there was a strong government in terms of institutional entity. The 
pacific reaction of the military to the reforms that were against itself, proved that the 
strong civilian governance, is a strong element of democratic civil military relations.    
Positive Approach of the Military towards the Elected 
Government 
 The Generals embraced the government of Turgut Özal, which 
garnered the majority of the votes. It was a product of the respect for the people and their 
choice. A similar case was in 2002, when the military embraced the JDP government. 
These are the indicators of a positive approach to the democracy by the military elite. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Turkish Military, the most trusted institution in the country for decades, has been 
a symbol of modernization and secularism in the country since the independence of the 
Republic in 1923. Especially with the introduction of the multi-party system after the 
Second World War, Turkish Military’s role became conspicuous by military 
interventions.  
 Turkey witnessed 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, and 2007 military interventions each 
in a different character. However, instead of grasping the civilian authority for decades, 
Turkish military elite tried to stay behind the curtains and passed on the governance to 
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the civilians. Turkey was under direct control of the military only through 1960–62 and 
1980–83.  
 Especially in the last decade, the change in civil-military relations aroused a 
scholarly debate on the role of the military in politics. This thesis examined the military 
interventions in order to define the attitudes of the military elite, by focusing on the 
reasons of the rapid shift of power from military to civilians.  
 The isolation from politics, which was initiated by the founder of the Turkey, 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, was one of the main reasons of the fast shift of power from the 
military to the civilian authority. Since Ataturk was a national symbol as the “father of 
the Turks,” his isolation from military by resigning in 1919, became an example and a 
tradition for the officer corps.  
 Democratic incentives, as part of the modernization of the country, have always 
been supported by the military and remained as one of the main reasons of the fast shift 
of power. The close relations with the West had a great role in this factor. 
 Institutional and economic developments were also decisive in the fast shift of 
power, although they gained vital importance in the last period of our study.  
This thesis argues that the delegation of power from military to civilians is mainly 
due to the harsh isolation of officer corps from politics, democratic incentives in terms of 
modernization, and economic and institutional developments.  
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